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Data has become an essential commodity in this day and age. Organisations want to 
share the massive amounts of data that they collect as a way to leverage and grow 
their businesses. On the other hand, the need to maintain privacy is critical in order to 
avoid the release of sensitive information. This has been shown to be a constant 
challenge, namely the trade-off between preserving privacy and data utility [1]. 
 
This study performs an evaluation of privacy models together with their relevant tools 
and techniques to ascertain whether data can be anonymised in such a way that it can 
be in compliance with the Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act and preserve 
the privacy of individuals. The results of this research should provide a practical 
solution for organisations in South Africa to adequately anonymise customer data to 
ensure POPI Act compliance with the use of a software tool. An experimental 
environment was setup with the ARX de-identification tool as the tool of choice to 
implement the privacy models. Two privacy models, namely k-anonymity and l-
diversity, were tested on a publicly available data set. Data quality models as well as 
privacy risk measures were implemented. 
 
The results of the study showed that when taking both data utility and privacy risks 
into consideration, neither privacy model was the clear winner. The K-anonymity 
privacy model was a better choice for data utility, whereas the l-diversity privacy model 
was a better choice for privacy preservation by reducing re-identification risks. 
Therefore, in relation to the aim of the study which is to compare the results of data 
anonymisation to ensure that data privacy needs are met more than data utility, the 
result showed that the l-diversity privacy model was the preferred model. 
 
Finally, considering that the POPI Act is still awaiting the final step to be promulgated, 
there is time to conduct further experiments in the various ways to practically 
implement and apply data anonymisation techniques in the day-to-day processing of 
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In this chapter, the introduction to the study is presented. The overview that provides 
the context to the study is presented first. Thereafter, the problem statement is 
identified. The research objectives in relation to the research aim are detailed resulting 
in the derived hypothesis and research questions that will be tested in this study. 
1.1 Overview 
 
Through the introduction of the Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act of 2017 
[2] (also known as POPIA), South Africa has taken its first steps towards enacting 
legislation that protects the privacy of individuals. With the enactment of the POPI Act, 
organisations and financial institutions in South Africa are required to protect customer 
information in the distribution and handling of data (both internally and externally) to 
ensure that they are compliant with the new regulations. In summary, the Act will 
impact all organisations and/or all parties within South Africa that are involved in the 
collection, processing, storage, and sharing of personal information. In the Act, 
‘personal information’ also includes ‘juristic persons’ which are defined as legal entities 
whose data must be kept safe and the purposes of the use of this data be limited. 
 
Businesses use information they store as an asset to give them a competitive 
advantage over their competitors by getting to know their customers better [3]. 
Advertisers also use it to find innovative ways to market their adverts to targeted 
consumers that are more likely to take up their products. However, the risk of releasing 
information, whether accidentally or on purpose, is always present. Therefore, the 
requirement for safeguarding personal information is of vital importance. As mentioned 
above, the sharing of personal information is a key concept that will be addressed by 
the POPI Act.  
 
Data anonymisation has been found to be one of the most effective ways to protect 
the privacy of individuals [3]. Other data privacy legislation around the world has been 
in place for longer than the POPI Act; therefore, extensive work has already been done 
within the research community relating to medical data and the protection of health 
information [4].  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 
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1996 is one such legislation that specifically defines methods for de-identifying data 
through the HIPAA Privacy Rule [5]  . 
 
Protecting personal customer information is a relatively new concept in South Africa. 
There is no clear direction on what organisations must do to ensure that they are taking 
appropriate measures to protect their stored information. Therefore, in South Africa, 
further research needs to be undertaken in order to consider the protection of data 
that is stored and how this data is protected when being shared or disseminated. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Whilst the usefulness of data that has been gathered by an organisation gives it a 
competitive advantage, it must be done in such a way that the privacy of an individual 
can still be protected. Many methods have been proposed to protect personal 
information over the years, for example cryptography, access control, and various 
other techniques [6]. However, these do not offer a guarantee of anonymity as the 
data is shared with recipients that are potentially unknown. 
 
To address the need for anonymising data before distribution can occur, various 
techniques have been proposed [6]. As an overall key theme in how these techniques 
work, they aim to satisfy certain privacy objectives and ensure data is useful. Privacy 
models ensure that the objectives of protecting privacy are met and are enforced by 
privacy algorithms. These privacy algorithms transform data minimally but still ensure 
protection of the data.  
 
Most of the use cases for the application of data anonymisation have been done within 
the area of healthy privacy, where data is transformed using generalisation and/or 
suppression. There is currently a lack of research related to the application of these 
data anonymisation techniques with regards to the POPI Act and is yet to be applied 
to this context. 
 
However, in terms of the practical application of performing data anonymisation, 
software tools that implement well-known data anonymisation models are not readily 
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available.  Software tools are indeed available, but these tools are not well 
documented or are complex to use. Furthermore, these tools have not been 
specifically applied to the context of data anonymisation for POPI Act compliance. 
 
This study will evaluate software tools that have been created for data anonymisation 
for other data privacy regulations and apply these data anonymisation models within 
the software tool in order to ensure POPI Act compliance in the sharing of personal 
information. 
 
1.3 Research Aim / Purpose  
 
The main purpose of this research is to evaluate privacy models and data 
anonymisation tools and techniques for the practical application of anonymising 
customer data that is stored and used within the South African banking environment 
in such a way to ensure POPI Act compliance.   
 
Two privacy models will be selected and applied to a customer data set.  The outcome 
is intended to show the level of data utility achieved as well as measure re-
identification risks in order to prevent personally identifiable information being leaked. 
The key consideration is whether further anonymisation being applied to the data set 
can result in lower re-identification risks. Furthermore, increasing the level of 
anonymisation could render the usability of the data set inadequate and, therefore, 
result in information loss and lower data quality. The trade-off between the two will be 
analysed in the results of this study, to show if there is a way to anonymise data 









1.4 Research Objective  
 
The objective of this research is to: 
1. Identify and evaluate existing data anonymisation techniques; 
2. Identify a data anonymisation tool to practically perform the data   
anonymisation process; 
3. Implement two privacy models within a data anonymisation tool; 
4. Compare and contrast the results of the privacy models with one another 
with regards to the lowest level of privacy risk to ensure POPI Act adherence; 
5. Compare and contrast the results of the privacy models with one another 
with regards to the highest level of utility retained so that the information is still 
useful; and 
6. Establish the effects of privacy risks and data utility for static customer 
data in relating to POPI Act compliance. 
 
The outcomes of this study will provide guidance to banking institutions on the way 
forward in the practical application of anonymisation tools to anonymise customer data 




In order to meet the objectives of the study, the following hypothesis has been 
formulated which will be tested during this study: 
 
Practically implementing the k-anonymity privacy model to anonymise customer 
data offers an effective solution to ensure POPI Act compliance by retaining the 







1.6 Research Questions 
 
In this study, the main research question specifically articulated in relation to the aim 
and purpose of the study that has been proposed follows: 
 
1. Which privacy preserving anonymisation model is effective for anonymising 
static customer data for POPI Act compliance? 
 
The following sub-research questions relate to the main research question: 
 
1.1 Which privacy preserving data anonymisation technique is effective in 
practically anonymising static customer data for POPI Act compliance by 
ensuring the lowest level of privacy risk? 
 
1.2  Can privacy-preserving data anonymisation techniques be practically 
applied to anonymise static customer data for POPI compliance in a way that 
preserves the greatest data utility? 
 
1.3 What are the effects of the levels of privacy risk and data utility in 
ensuring POPI Act compliance of static customer data? 
 
Table 1 below shows, in a summarised tabular view, how the research questions 
stated above map to the research objectives described in the previous section: 
 
Table 1: Illustration of research objectives to research questions 
Research Objective Research Question 
Identify and evaluate existing 
data anonymisation techniques 
Which privacy preserving anonymisation model 
is effective for anonymising static customer data 
for POPI Act compliance? 
Identify a data anonymisation 
tool to practically perform the 
data   anonymisation process 
Which privacy preserving anonymisation model 
is effective for anonymising static customer data 
for POPI Act compliance? 
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Implement two privacy models 
within a data anonymisation tool 
Which privacy preserving anonymisation model 
is effective for anonymising static customer data 
for POPI Act compliance? 
Compare and contrast the 
results of the privacy models with 
one another with regards to the 
lowest level of privacy risk to 
ensure POPI Act adherence; 
Which privacy preserving data anonymisation 
technique is effective in practically anonymising 
static customer data for POPI Act compliance by 
ensuring the lowest level of privacy risk? 
Compare and contrast the 
results of the privacy models with 
one another with regards to the 
highest level of utility retained so 
that the information is still useful  
Can privacy-preserving data anonymisation 
techniques be practically applied to anonymise 
static customer data for POPI compliance in a 
way that preserves the greatest data utility? 
Establish the effects of privacy 
risks and data utility for static 
customer data in relating to POPI 
Act compliance 
What are the effects of the levels of privacy risk 
and data utility in ensuring POPI Act compliance 
of static customer data? 
 
1.7 Research Methodology 
 
To address the hypothesis and research questions in this study, an experiment was 
used. By performing an experiment, the results intend to show the cause-and-effect of 
using two privacy models for anonymisation when implementing these models on the 
same dataset.  The results expect to show the researcher the data utility as well as 
data privacy outcomes. The data set obtained was from the Microsoft AdventureWorks 
2016 sample data warehouse and this was used as it closely represented a realistic 
data set of static customer data that was publicly available. This dataset was imported 
into the chosen tool, ARX, where it was configured for anonymisation. Thereafter the 





1.8 Importance of the Research  
 
The importance of this research is to provide a structured, clear way for organisations 
in South Africa to perform data anonymisation on customer data sets. This contribution 
is a tangible solution to protect personal information. The method in which the data 
anonymisation techniques and privacy models are implemented are practical in 
nature, thereby allowing the reader to make the clear link between theory surrounding 
data anonymisation and the practicality of using privacy preservation techniques. An 
important result of this research is that the techniques applied in this study can be 
used to anonymise customer data to ensure POPI compliance.  
 
1.9 Limitations of the Study 
 
This study did not take the following points into consideration and, therefore, are not 
in the scope of this study: 
• The customer data set that is used in the study was specifically chosen as it 
contained a set of customer information that included data attributes that 
resembled real-world customer data. The results in this study relate to the 
customer data set selected; 
• The customer data set used in this study represents a snapshot of data at a 
particular point in time which is referenced as static data and does not apply to 
streaming data that changes ad hoc; and 
•  Only two privacy models were selected to perform the data anonymisation 
techniques, but this was considered adequate for the study, within the defined 
scope. 
 
1.10 Thesis Outline 
 
In this study, the motivation and background information for data privacy is presented. 
This chapter sets the context and motivation for the study and the problem statement 
is discussed. A clear hypothesis with research questions is presented so that an 
overall aim can be achieved. In Chapter 2, the rationale and justification for data 
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privacy and data anonymisation is discussed. The relevant methods for data de-
identification as well as legislation and laws surrounding data privacy is mentioned. In 
Chapter 3, a study of data anonymisation privacy model, privacy tools, and privacy 
techniques are performed. In Chapter 4, the approach and how the test environment 
was setup is outlined. In Chapter 5, the implementation of the selected tool is 
performed taking into considering the aspects of the design proposed. In Chapter 6, 
the results of the implementation of the test are documented. The evaluation of the 
results as presented in the previous chapter is done in Chapter 7. A summary of the 
results achieved, and findings is provided in Chapter 8, along with a conclusion relating 
to the initial aims and objectives of the study. Recommendations for future work is also 
presented in Chapter 8. Figure 1 below shows the graphical breakdown of the chapters 
in this study. 
 
 




2  BACKGROUND 
 
In this chapter, the background information related to data privacy is presented. The 
chapter starts with the initiatives that support the need for data privacy being detailed 
together with why data anonymisation was considered in this study as the way to 
protect customer information. Thereafter, terms and detailed definitions of data 
anonymisation and de-identification of data are provided. Lastly, the various 
legislations and laws surrounding data privacy are outlined with a description of data 
breaches that have occurred as a result. 
 
2.1 Data Privacy Initiative 
 
Recent developments with regards to data privacy in South Africa, notably the trends 
towards protecting the personal identifying information of customers, are accompanied 
by significant needs of privacy protection. In 2016, the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development proposed that an estimated 108 countries globally had 
enacted some sort of data privacy legislation [7]. 
 
As the United Nations have pointed out in this article [7], the challenges that have been 
faced by each of these countries have a common thread [7]: 
(1) Long timeframes to pass legislation; 
(2) Financial expenses to enforce the implementation of new data privacy 
legislation; 
(3) A general lack of knowledge in the regulation of the new data privacy 
legislation as well as the limited cooperation between the public and private 
institutions.   
 
A key point listed in the article above as a challenge is the lack of knowledge 
surrounding the implementation of the POPI Act in South Africa. As detailed in the 
study done more recently in 2017, referred to in article [8], in South Africa, a survey 
was performed to check the level of readiness of organisations to implement the POPI 
Act. An important result that was presented in the findings was that organisations that 
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took part in the research were not ready (at that stage) to be able to reliably ensure 
compliance of the POPI Act data privacy legislation. 
 
If as a result of the POPI Act there is non-compliance by organisations in South Africa, 
there may be far-reaching consequences to them as a result. Penalties enforced for 
non-compliance can be quite costly, not to mention the reputational damage that can 
occur [9]. The Information Regulator has many options as a course of action for non-
compliance: it may choose to prosecute the organisation by laying criminal charges 
against them together with the organisation also possibly being fined up R10 million. 
This could, however, be extended to include twelve months of prison time to be served 
as well. Prison terms can be extended up to ten years if a transgressor knowingly 
withholds information or obstructs the investigations into non-compliance. The 
Information Regulator may also issue an “enforcement notice” to immediately stop the 
storage and processing of personal information. 
 
Consequently, in an effort to avoid the penalties that could potentially be faced for non-
compliance, it is noted that there is clearly a need for data anonymisation approaches 
to be considered for implementation in preparation for the enactment of the POPI Act. 
 
2.2 Why Perform Data Anonymisation? 
 
Personally identifiable information (PII) is defined as information collected that in some 
way can identify the real identity of an individual or subject [10]. Additionally, the POPI 
Act refers to the term PII as well. 
 
A few direct examples of PII taken from the study in [10] are: 
• “Name (full name, maiden name, mother ‘s maiden name, or alias); 
• A personal identification number (identity number, passport number, driver’s 
license number, taxpayer identification number, bank account number, credit 
card number); 
• Address information (street address, email address); 
• Personal characteristics information (photographic images, fingerprints, 




To ensure the privacy of PII, safeguards need to be put into place to protect sensitive 
data. The POPI act specifically contains principles that govern how data should be 
stored, used and processed, and more specifically relates to the security of the 
sensitive data [2] . The principles are:  
1. Accountability 
2. Processing Limitation 
3. Purpose Specification 
4. Further Processing Limitation 
5. Information Quality 
6. Openness 
7. Security Safeguards 
8. Data Subject Participation 
 
The principle, Security Safeguards and Controls, states that when personal 
information is collected, it must be sufficiently safeguarded from loss and being 
accessed unlawfully. The expectation is that sufficient measures (physically and 
electronically) must be taken by the organisation to ensure that the security and 
safeguard of the PII is in place  [10]. 
 
A way of protecting PII is through data anonymisation. Data anonymisation involves 
removing the link between an individual and information that which identifies any 
individual’s identity. An important consideration of doing this is to sanitise the 
information to a level that privacy and data utility is still maintained. By sanitising the 
data set, thereby removing personally identifiable information (PII),  a comfortable level 
of anonymisation can be achieved [11]. 
 
A use case for data anonymisation within the banking industry and in context of this 
research is the anonymisation of customer data. Customer data is collected daily by 
banks and financial institutions. This stored data is considered ‘personal information’ 
as this data usually contains common personal information like names, date or birth 
and identity numbers; therefore, this information must be protected. In order to ensure 
the usefulness of data post anonymisation, the  data must also be sufficiently 
anonymised, simultaneously ensuring minimal information loss [12].  
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Within the context of this study, the researcher aims to provide a practical 
implementation of anonymisation methods to sufficiently anonymise data and ensure 
minimal information loss. 
 
2.3 Privacy Preserving Concepts 
 
In modern day society, personal data or information is a commodity. There is 
constantly a need to release data external to an organisation, be it publicly or internally, 
so that it can be available to third  parties for analysis without the disclosure of personal 
information that it contains [13]. There are many techniques and methods that try to 
address this problem. A few concepts are described below. 
 
2.3.1 Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) 
 
Firstly, data mining entails extracting patterns (knowledge) from data sets which can 
then be interpreted by an external user and represented in meaningful ways. Data 
transformation methods that cater for the extraction of knowledge from data whilst at 
the same time aiming to enforce rules to maintain privacy are known as privacy 
preserving data mining (PPDM) techniques[14] . 
 
There are many approaches which have been adopted for privacy preserving data 
mining. These can be classified based on the following five dimensions as outlined in 
[15]: 
 
1. Data Distribution  
This approach refers to the distribution of data. There are two types, horizontal 
distribution and vertical distribution. With vertical distribution of data, the values 
for different attributes reside different places whilst with the horizontal 







2. Data Modification 
Data modification is a way of changing the original values in the data set prior 
to release to a third party. Modification methods include blocking, perturbation, 
aggregation, sampling, and swapping. 
 
3. Data Mining Algorithm 
Different data mining algorithms are available. These include classification data 
mining algorithms, like association rule mining algorithms, decision tree 
inducers, rough sets, Bayesian networks, and clustering algorithms. 
 
4. Data or Rule Hiding 
This dimension refers to hiding data where it could be in the form of raw data 
or aggregated data.  
 
5. Privacy Preservation 
Finally, the selective modification of data is the last dimension to be discussed, 
which is the most important. This technique ensures privacy preservation. Data 
is modified selectively so that a greater level of utility is obtained and done in a 
way that privacy can be preserved.  
 
2.3.2 Privacy Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) 
One solution to realise privacy is to anonymise records in a data set before it can be 
published. Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) performed at data publishing is 
commonly termed Privacy Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) [16].  
 
The initial rationale of performing PPDM was the extension of the traditional data 
mining techniques to modify data to mask sensitive information. PPDM solutions were 
closely linked with existing data mining algorithms that are available. With PPDP, the 
objective is how to publish data that is still useful for data mining purposes, whereas 




2.3.3 Data De-identification  
To realise the benefits of sharing data whilst still maintaining privacy, de-identification 
can be used. De-identification is a technique that removes obvious identifying 
information from disclosed records [18]. One approach to aid in the legitimate and 
authorised disclosure of personal health information is to de-identify data prior to it 
being used or at the earliest opportunity [19].  
 
De-identification occurs as a result of removing personal information which is used 
(whether directly or indirectly) to identify individuals in a data set. De-identification is a 
technique used to remove personal information of which pseudonymisation and 
anonymisation are a type of de-identification method.  These techniques are used to 
reduce the risk of identifying individuals from an unsecured data set. Within the 
expanse of data privacy, these terms are often misrepresented and interchanged in 
their use with no consensus of the terminology used [20].  
 
Currently, the most frequently used application of PPDM techniques relates to the 
release of health care data related to patient information. In the United States (US) 
this legislation is referred to as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) [4]. The HIPAA is discussed in further detail in the next section. 
 
2.3.4 Data Anonymisation and Data Pseudonymisation 
 
Data anonymisation can be defined as a method of sanitising information with the aim 
of protecting privacy whilst at the same time retaining the ease of analysis.  
 
Pseudonymisation is when the aim is to reverse the process of anonymisation and a 
variable or identifier is used to replace the original data [21]. As this study suggests, 
when using pseudonymisation, it can be difficult to keep the usefulness of the 
information when processing it whilst at the same time ensure anonymisation of the 
data to a sufficient level of privacy. By “replacing an attribute with another”, which 
occurs with pseudonymisation, it allows the logical integrity of the source of the 
individual data to be kept by being able to identify a particular individual if necessary. 
16 
 
However, the individual is not able to be directly identified as the data is obfuscated or 
masked. 
 
This study will focus on commonly used and data anonymisation techniques that have 
been proposed in studies involving the anonymisation of health care information. The 
full anonymisation process has many techniques that are available, namely 
generalisation, suppression, micro-aggregation, and subsampling. Generalisation, as 
quoted by Sweeney et al. [11], “involves replacing (or recoding) a value with a less 
specific but semantically consistent value. Suppression involves not releasing a value 
at all.” Sweeney is one of the forerunners in research pertaining to data anonymisation. 
It was further mentioned by [11] that a combination of generalisation and suppression 
is a common method used by the k-anonymity privacy model. Micro-aggregation and 
subsampling are not part of the scope of this research as a technique of choice.  
 
In contrast, the converse of anonymisation is called re-identification, or sometimes 
referred to as de-anonymisation. The next section discusses this further. 
 
2.3.5 Re-identification  
 
The reverse process of de-identification is re-identification, which happens when a 
single record within a data set can be identified. The simplest example of a form of re-
identification is called identity disclosure. Identity disclosure occurs when a match is 
made in a de-identified data set with a record in a publicly known data set  [18]. Further 
detail on the various methods of privacy threats are outlined in Chapter 3.  
 
Furthermore, various data utility metrics have been proposed to measure risk. These 
metrics are very important so that data utility loss can be quantified and as a result be 
used to assess the level of de-identification in a created dataset [20]. 
 
To this end, by using metrics that have been proposed in other research areas 
involving data anonymisation, it is possible to use the same methods to establish the 
likelihood of re-identifying a person’s information based on a specific data set. This 
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metric of re-identification is important in this study as it will be used in testing the 
hypothesis as defined. 
2.4 International Legislation Surrounding Data Privacy 
 
Data protection is a hot topic amongst developed nations around the world. Each 
country has various levels of maturity when it comes to data protection, and this is 
mainly as a result of the various timelines for when data protection laws were 
introduced and enforced.  
 
This section outlines the more popular data protection legislation and laws that are 
currently in force around the world. These are the most comprehensive set of laws 
relating to data protection that is currently available. 
 
2.4.1 Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act: South Africa 
 
The Protection of Personal Information Act (POPI) Act was promulgated (or signed 
into law) in November 2013 [2]. This is South Africa’s first data protection legislation. 
It is, however, currently not ‘effective’ as yet. As soon as the POPI Act is effective, 
organisations and institutions in South Africa will be afforded a one-year grace period 
to comply with POPIA. Regulations relating to the POPI Act were tabled in parliament 
on 3 December 2018 and were published in the Government Gazette on 14 December 
2018 [22]. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the POPI act specifically contains principles that 
govern how data should be stored, used and processed, and more specifically relates 
to the security of the sensitive data [2] [23] . The principles are:  
1. “Accountability: The responsible party must ensure that the principles are 
adhered to; 
2. Processing Limitation: There must be limits to the processing of information; 
processing must be lawful and not excessive; 
3. Purpose Specification: Personal information must be collected for a specific, 
defined and lawful purpose that is related to the responsible party’s activity; the 
subject should be aware of this purpose; 
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4. Further Processing Limitation: Any further processing must be compatible with 
the purpose that the information was collected for; 
5. Information Quality: The responsible party must ensure that the personal 
information is complete, accurate and not misleading; the information can be 
updated if necessary; 
6. Openness: A notification must be given to the Information Protection Regulator 
before the information is processed the subject must be notified that data is 
being collected about them; 
7. Security Safeguards: The responsible party must ensure that the integrity of the 
collected personal information is maintained; 
8. Data Subject Participation: The subject has the right to ask and be given the 
details of any information on him/her that the responsible party might have, at 
no cost.” 
 
There are severe consequences for  noncompliance of the POPI Act [2][24]. When 
conducting business within South Africa, the POPI Act will dictate the steps on how 
organisations would go about processing personal information that is compliant with 
the Act. The principles of the POPI Act outlined these considerations. 
 
Furthermore, to ensure enforcement and promote the rights protected by POPIA, the 
Act states that the government must appoint an Information Regulator. An information 
regulator was appointed in November 2016 to fulfil this purpose as regulation without 
enforcement is not efficient [25]. 
 
Should an organisation be investigated by the Information Regulator and found in 
violation of the POPI Act, the following four consequences could result [2][26] : 
1. Administrative fines levied on organisations of up to ten million rand; 
2. Criminal prosecution with fines of up to ten million rand and the possible 
inclusion of a prison term of up to twelve months; 
3. Issue of an “enforcement notice” to immediately cease the processing personal 
information; and 




POPIA, however, also has the following exclusions when referring to violations of the 
Act [24]: 
• When information is processed in a personal capacity and not in a commercial 
environment; 
• De-identified data where the application of anonymisation techniques were 
used correctly; and 
• When information collected enhances the safety of the public at large or is in 
the interest of national security [2]. 
 
2.4.2 African Privacy Laws 
 
There are different data protection laws in Africa and is increasing as a result of more 
and more nations conducting their business on a global scale and expanding. As of 
2017, there are an estimated sixteen African countries that have enacted data 
protection legislation, five countries have initiated have data protection bills and nine 
have intentions to enact data protection bills. However this process has not been fully 
completed in these countries, as in the case of South Africa [23]. 
 
A comparison of selected African privacy laws compared to the POPI Act is shown 





Figure 2: Comparison of selected African privacy laws with POPIA [23] 
 
The relevance for including the comparison of other African privacy laws is often that 
data and personal information is moved across borders to other regions by 
organisations and businesses, and as a result one should be familiar with privacy laws 
of these regions. Doing business within Africa is no exception. It is always necessary 
to have this information known so that adequate privacy protection levels can be put 
in place by South African businesses when conducting business in Africa [23].  
 
 
2.4.3 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): European Union 
 
On 25 May 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (also called the GDPR) 
became law. The introduction of GDPR was done to “modernise laws that protect the 
personal information of individuals” [27]. The European Union (EU) recently adopted 




Previous data protection laws in the EU were in force since the 1990’s and had 
become very outdated [29]. Changes to the world we live in with regards to people, 
processes, and technology have necessitated the changes to privacy laws so that 
current needs are met. The GDPR was a direct replacement of the data protection 
directive of 1995, which makes it the new framework in Europe for data protection [30]. 
The GDPR standardises laws across European countries and aims to strengthen the 
data rights of individuals[31]. The Information Commissioner's Office has been tasked 
with enforcing the law in the UK [24]. 
 
The GDPR supersedes all existing national laws that are currently in force by EU 
members [30]. It includes changes to the previous Data Protection law (Directive 
95/46/CE) that includes high penalties if compliance is not enforced within companies 
[30].  Organisations need to be internally structured so that there is appropriate 
accountability placed on individuals within the organisations by having a data 
protection officer (DPO), and also requiring immediate notification of data breaches to 
regulators within certain timeframes[27]. With GDPR, by needing to obtain an 
individual’s consent to process their personal information has also made the 
processing of personal information more difficult than previously [30].  
 
With the transitional period of two years that was given to organisations in the EU to 
become compliant between 2016 and 2018, this allowed for the interrogation of the 
new GDPR principles by companies to make room for an amendment of company 
policies and procedures in order to be in line with the new GDPR Act.  
 
2.4.4 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA): The 
United States of America 
 
In the United States (US), there are multiple patchwork laws that make up regulations 
for the processing of personal information [32]. As there is an overlap of federal and 
state laws, these laws do not provide thorough and extensive protection over data 
rules relating to individuals as is required. 
 
 Below are the two most commonly known US federal privacy laws [32]: 
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• The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) is a federal law that protects 
consumers. This law is intended to stop the unfair practices associated with 
offline and online security policies relating to privacy.  
• The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) released in 
1996 regulates the release of medical data. The HIPAA Privacy Rule 
specifically applies to “the collection and use of protected health information 
(PHI)” and contains standards that must be considered when protecting medical 
data. 
 
The HIPAA requires an institution to notify data subjects of their rights to privacy and 
the institutions’ requisite privacy practices [32]. The HIPAA Privacy Rule went a step 
further to specify 18 fields of data for generalisation or removal from the data set [3].  
 
An important update was made to the HIPAA in September 2013, with the 
implementation of the ’Omnibus Rule’  [33] . The aim of the ‘Omnibus Rule’ was to 
tighten and strengthen the personal privacy of individuals. It also expanded the 
definition of “covered businesses”. A covered business with regards to the Omnibus 
Rule references all companies that create, collect, store, or transmit PHI on behalf of 
another covered entity. This, therefore, provides all-round protection of personal 
information.  
 
2.5 Data Breaches 
 
When data is released to external parties outside an organisation, measures must be 
taken to ensure that the data is in an anonymised form. However, there are occasions 
where even though anonymisation was applied, it was not sufficient. One of the most 
common attacks when it comes to data breaches are called inference attacks where 
a combination of attributes could be used to identify an individual.  As mentioned in  
[34], Sweeney successfully showed that by using a combination of address code, 
respondents’ gender, and respondents’ birthdate, 87% of the United States of 
America’s (US) population could be identified [34]. 
 
In this section, a few known data security breaches are outlined. 
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2.5.1 The Netflix Prize  
 
Netflix is a service that lets users view TV shows, movies, and documentaries that are 
streamed via the internet into their homes [35].  
 
In 2006, Netflix ran a competition and released almost half a million records publicly, 
which contained the movie-rating preferences of anonymised users. There were 100 
million movie ratings released purposely as a source of information for the competition 
called The Netflix Prize. Information that could identify customers was removed and 
contestants had to predict which movies customers would prefer. To see if the 
predictions were correct, they were compared to how customers rated those movies 
in real life [36]. 
 
After the release of this data, the data set was de-anonymised successfully [36]. The 
researchers in this article could identify some on the ‘anonymised’ users with ease, if 
some knowledge about information pertaining to individuals within the data set was 
known. Prior to the release, Netflix had consulted with computer scientists in the field 
to anonymise the data. In this scenario the appropriate action to ensure the privacy of 
the data set was taken, however, it was not adequate. Common personal information 
included in the Netflix release was the same as the study by Sweeney where an 
individual’s gender, address code, and birthdate could identify up to 87% of the 
population of the US [34].  
  
2.5.2 The Personal Genome Project 
 
The Personal Genome Project (PGP) was started in 2006. One of the aims of the 
project was “to sequence the genotypic and phenotypic information of volunteers and 
display it publicly online in an extensive public database.” The volunteers were 
informed prior to the research being done in order to obtain their consent [37]. 
 
This project resulted in another breach of personal information in 2013 that was 
identified by Sweeney, together with other researchers. This study was able to link an 
individual’s name and their contact details to publicly available profiles of individuals 
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that took part in the Personal Genome Project. The publicly available profiles from the 
Personal Genome Project contained private medical information, genomic information, 
as well as demographic information, such as birthdate, sex, and address codes. 
Demographic information found was linked to public records such as voter lists, 
thereby resulting in identifying 84% to 97% of the profiles for which names were 
provided [38].  
2.6 Related Work 
 
A common use for data anonymisation is within the area of data publishing of sensitive 
information by governmental organisations around the world. The Public Use 
Microdata Sample (PUMS) files provided by U.S. Census Bureau is an example of 
such publishing. The data set was de-identified prior to release for statistical purposes. 
Other statistical agencies also perform a similar function with their data, including the  
Confidentialised Unit Record Files (CURF) provided by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) and Statistics New Zealand [39].   
 
There are however a few limitations to consider when anonymising raw health data in 
preparation for data publishing. When using the k-anonymity and l-diversity privacy 
models, it is difficult to specify the quasi-identifiers upfront when it is unknown what 
information adversaries that would attack the data already have. Furthermore, data 
mining results that is done on already anonymised data could be potentially different 
from the original data [39]. In the examples mentioned above, it is rarely possible to 
use the output data set for meaningful data mining as it will differ vastly from the 
original dataset. To this end, there are many studies that considers the topic of 
protecting sensitive data whilst still maintaining data utility. Some of the work in this 
area includes, among others [1], [40] and [7]. In this study, it is proposed to measure 
and identify those privacy models that can be used to gain the most utility of a data 
set within the South African context of POPIA. 
 
Personal health information is another popular area where information about a person 
is most sensitive and contains intimate details, be it physical health or mental health. 
Therefore, confidentiality of this data must be protected at all costs and exposure of 
this trusted information must be avoided. Conversely, by de-identifying personal health 
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information, it can be used for secondary purposes that are important, like research in 
the health field  [41]. As mentioned in the previous section, the HIPAA Act of 1996 
legislation specifically defined methods for de-identifying health data [5].  
 
Whilst the articles above contribute to advancing the concepts of data anonymisation, 
generalisation and suppression, it unfortunately does not address the practical 
application of these privacy models and concepts. In Spengler et al [42], an important 
aim of the article was to bridge the gap between legislation pertaining to data privacy 
and the practical, technical solutions that are required. In that article, the open source 
data anonymisation tool ARX was used to implement anonymisation by using 
generalisation and k-anonymity. Health related data was used for the purposes of that 
study  [42]. 
 
Alternatively in [43], the technique of k-anonymity was proposed to create k-
anonymous tables from a set of customer records. This is done in a distributed 
scenario where there is a miner that wants to mine the entire table of customer records. 
Whilst the articles major contribution was a use case for the anonymisation of 
customer data, the author does not consider the anonymisation of customer data in a 
practical way as this study suggests.  With the inception of POPIA and taking that into 




This chapter began with a discussion of the data privacy initiative and the motivation 
and rationale for performing data anonymisation. A brief overview of the data 
anonymisation and de-identification concepts was then outlined in order to provide a 
background to privacy preserving data mining and privacy preserving data publishing. 
Legislation and laws surrounding data protection was discussed with examples of data 
breaches that have previously occurred. Data privacy regarding data utility and 
attacker models was outlined. Finally, other related work in this area of data 
anonymisation were mentioned. In the next chapter, privacy models, techniques, 
threats, and their associated tools are discussed in detail. 
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3 DATA ANONYMISATION: PRIVACY MODELS, 
TECHNIQUES, TOOLS AND PRIVACY THREATS 
 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that there exists a need for maintaining data 
privacy by focusing on data anonymisation. Legislation and laws have been introduced 
to ensure that the privacy of individuals is maintained. 
 
In this chapter, the theoretical understanding of the various privacy models, 
techniques, and tools that are available are examined. Firstly, the data anonymisation 
techniques are presented showing the two broad categories that are available when 
performing anonymisation. Thereafter, a description of common privacy threats with 
examples are provided. Popular privacy models are explained in order to show the 
various ways that these anonymisation techniques can be implemented within privacy 
models. Furthermore, important parameters for resolving data privacy issues are 
discussed, namely data utility and attacker models. Finally, a summary of the suite of 
anonymisation tools and technologies that are available to perform anonymisation are 
presented. 
 
3.1  Data Anonymisation Techniques 
 
Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) techniques can be implemented in a way to 
ensure privacy but also extract knowledge contained in the data set [14]. The utility of 
the data is maximised because the guarantee of privacy levels is built into these 
techniques.  As a result, data mining actions can still be sufficiently performed on the 
transformed data. 
 
Anonymisation of a data set before the data set is published can also be done. PPDM 
that occurs at the same time or prior to data publishing is referred to as Privacy 
Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) [14]. This study will focus on anonymising a data 
set prior to it being used by a third party or external organisation; therefore, the focus 




To achieve this goal of eliminating the ability to identify an individual from personal 
data sets, data anonymisation techniques are needed to accomplish these tasks. Data 




These two categories are described in further detail. 
 
3.1.1 Perturbative Techniques 
Perturbation involves replacing the original values in a data set for values with the 
same statistical information [14]. As a result, this method extorts the original data. 
There are many types of perturbative techniques, with the most common being the 
addition of noise into a data set as well as data swapping. Both techniques are 
described below. 
 
3.1.1.1 Adding Noise to a Data set 
 
The use of perturbation necessitates introducing an external factor such as “noise" 
into the data in order to mask individual values [44]. One method to achieve this is by 
using a technique called randomisation, where noise that is added is so large that it is 
difficult to recognise the individual records in a data set.  A disadvantage to this is that 
perturbative techniques distort the data and do not preserve the truthfulness of the 
data set thereby making it nearly impossible to obtain accurate statistical information 
as a  result [44], [45]. 
 
3.1.1.2 Swapping values in a data set 
 
Data swapping involves swapping values across a data set to maintain the 
preservation of privacy [44], [46]. As some databases are used for statistical purposes, 
the aggregation (or aggregate characteristics like averages and totals) of the data is 
important [45]. Therefore, the use of swapping values is a better option for statistical 
purposes. These data transformations, when the swapping is complete, map back to 
the original data and exhibits the similar properties. As data swapping is a data 
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transformation technique, the resultant data can be used for statistical tabulation as 
all data is released [46]. An important advantage is that data swapping does not have 
the same weakness as randomisation in that it guarantees that statistics will be 
preserved. 
 
3.1.2 Non-Perturbative Techniques 
 
Non-perturbation techniques involve reducing the granularity of the individual data set 
to achieve privacy [47]. In this way the original data set is kept the same and is not 
altered, therefore, no extra “noise” is added as with perturbative techniques. An 
important outcome of not introducing additional “noise” into a data set is that the 
truthfulness of the data can be preserved. Two techniques that are commonly used 
because they do not disturb the original data set is the use of a generalisation and a 




Generalisation involves replacing a value within a data set with a less specific value 
that is semantically consistent [11]. This is sometimes known as recoding. A few terms 
must first be explained to understand how the concept works. 
 
Firstly, in a data set, an attribute represents each column in the data set and contains 
all possible set of values in that domain  [11]. Attributes in a table are unique to each 
other.  Generalisation is commonly performed using a generalisation hierarchy to 
transform the attributes. In a generalisation hierarchy, the uppermost parent node is 
the highest general value within that domain. As the hierarchy is split into its respective 
leaf nodes downwards, the values become more granular and specific. In this way 
values higher up in the hierarchy are grouped into larger numbers to distort the ability 
of an attacker to gain knowledge of a specific value. 
 
Secondly, a direct identifier is an attribute that is highly distinguishable and can be 
used to explicitly identify a record [11]. Some of these attributes include name, 
address, and identity number, just to name a few. As these attributes are too obvious 
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in identifying a record, it is usually suppressed from a data set to limit the release of 
private information. 
 
Thirdly, the term quasi-identifier (QID) refers to those attributes that together may be 
linked to identify an individual [12]. Quasi-identifiers are commonly referred to as 
indirect identifiers. On their own these attributes cannot be used as an identifier, 
however, when used in combination it is possible to use them for linkage. Moreover, 
very often these attributes are needed in the data set as they are useful in the analysis 
that will be performed on the data set. Therefore, during the data anonymisation 
process, quasi-identifiers are transformed thereby ensuring that privacy needs are 
met.   
 
Finally, the last term to understand when performing generalisation is called sensitive 
attributes or SA [48]. Sensitive attributes are those attributes that are personal and 
that most individuals do not want shared, for example disease diagnosis, salary, 
disability status and the like.  
 
Taken from [12], below is an example of how a generalisation hierarchy is derived.  
 
Table 2: Data set with Quasi-identifiers Before and After Transformation using 
Generalisation [12] 
Before Generalisation After Generalisation 
Age Gender Age Gender 
34 Male 20 - 39 Male 
22 Female 20 - 39 Female 
66 Male 60 - 79 Male 
70 Male 60 - 79 Male 
35 Female 20 - 39 Female 
21 Male 20 - 39 Male 
18 Female * Female 




In Table 2 above, the example data set contains two attributes, age and gender. Both 
attributes are classified as quasi-identifiers. After the generalisation, the quasi-
identifier Age has been transformed into age groups of twenty per group.  
 
The generalisation hierarchy for the attribute Age is shown in Figure 3 below. The 
attribute has been grouped with a parent node at the highest point, and then gradually 
reduced into smaller, more specific groupings in each of the leaf nodes. The quasi-
identifier Gender could only be suppressed. 
 
 
Figure 3: Generalisation Hierarchy for quasi-identifier Age [12] 
 
A key disadvantage to using generalisation is that the generalisation hierarchy must 




When suppression is used, a value is not released at all [11]. It suppresses the entire 
value of that attribute and that value is, therefore, removed from the data set [50]. The 
resultant value becomes a null value. 
 
In reference to the Table 2 and Figure 3 above, the attribute Gender is transformed 
using suppression. Suppression is commonly used when the release of a specific 
value can lead to a significant breach of the privacy of that individual record. The 
different types of suppression referred to in  [50], [51] are: 
• attribute suppression – when the whole values are suppressed 
• record suppression – when the full row or record is suppressed 
• value suppression – when a certain value in a data set is suppressed  
• cell suppression – suppresses some records in a data set  
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• multidimensional suppression – when values in certain records are suppressed, 
in relation to other values in the data set.  
 
In summary, there are privacy models that make use of generalisation and 
suppression to enforce privacy. Further details on these privacy models are outlined 
in the next section.  
 
3.2 Privacy Threats 
 
When anonymising structured data, a general method of attack assumes the linkage 
of a protected data set with a public data set (or similar background knowledge about 
individuals that are known) [52].  
 
There are three common types of privacy threats, namely [53]: 
• Membership Disclosure 
• Attribute Disclosure 
• Identity Disclosure 
 
A brief summary of each privacy threat is outlined below. 
 
3.2.1 Membership Disclosure 
With membership disclosure, linkage of the data could allow an attacker to learn 
whether one’s information is included in a data set. This becomes a problem when the 
selected data set contains information of sensitive attributes that are the same, for 
example only diagnoses of diabetes patients or cancer patients. This sensitive 
information can be inferred and revealed by an attacker [53]. 
 
3.2.2 Attribute Disclosure 
Attribute disclosure occurs when new information about a data subject that is 
contained in a data set is revealed to an unauthorised party. By viewing the data that 
has been released, an attacker would be able to infer the attributes of an individual 
quite easily than would have been possible prior to the data release [53]. In other 
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words, sensitive attributes that an individual would not want disclosed must be 
protected from an attacker [54].  
 
3.2.3 Identity Disclosure 
With identity disclosure, a link can be made between an individual and a specific record 
in a data set quite easily. This is also referred to as re-identification. With this type of 
attack the institutions that are supposed to protect the data in question could face 
serious consequences as a result of this data leak, which is a result of privacy 
regulations that are not met or enforced [52].  
 
A simple visual example of these three types of privacy threats taken from [52] are 
shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Types of attributes with types of disclosure [52] 
 
3.3 Privacy Models  
 
The transformation of data inevitably leads to a loss of information [55]. In order to 
avoid this, a balance must be sought between an increase in privacy protection on one 
side and a decrease in data quality on the other.  
 
When disclosing personal information in data sets, there is always the risk of re-
identification. Privacy models ensure that privacy requirements are met, whilst the 
implementation of the privacy model is performed using data transformation, thereby 
preserving utility [48]. This section provides further information on the privacy models 





Finding and accessing information in this digital age has become very easy. Therefore, 
the privacy considerations of individual subjects have taken on an importance not 
considered previously. A common practice where this is used is when large databases 
are used to store personal information of a sensitive nature but identifiers are removed 
to ensure privacy [12]. 
 
Consequently, this released information can be linked with the individual’s 
corresponding known information, possibly from other databases that are publicly 
available. As such, the privacy of an individual’s information can potentially be violated. 
As mentioned previously, Sweeney [56] demonstrated it is possible to find out who 
has a certain disease using a publicly available health database linked together with 
voter lists. As a possible solution for the problem, Samarati and Sweeney  [57] were 
the first to propose a technique called k- anonymisation.  
 
The k-anonymity principle was first used in protecting the association of a patient’s 
record in publicly available data directly to a patient. Data from these two records can 
be interpreted and then triangulated to obtain the personal information of an individual, 
thereby disclosing their identity [58]. 
 
K-anonymity requires that “each record in a data set is indistinguishable from at least 
k − 1 other records regarding attributes which could be used for re-identification 
attacks” [59]. In the following scenario, if k =3 and the potentially identifying variables 
are date of birth and gender, the resultant k-anonymised data set will have at least 
three records for each combination of date of birth and gender. As a result, this type 
of anonymisation reduces any risks of re-identification to data subjects, for example, 
where there is a data breach and the data cannot be linked to any specific individual 
[60]. 
 
According to [12], data is transformed via two methods when using k-anonymity: (a) 
firstly, the generalisation of attribute values, and thereafter (b), the data records are 
suppressed. Generalisation results in data that is well-suited for analyses by scientists 
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who study diseases within populations, while  suppression significantly reduces loss 
of information. [12]  also found that the combination of generalisation and suppression 
results in a significant increase in data utility. Consequently, in this study, 
generalisation and the suppression of data will be used to determine whether it is an 
effective approach to transform the data in question. 
 
In the k-anonymisation process, it is important to identify key attributes. As previously 
mentioned, direct identifiers like first name, social security number, and identity 
numbers must be removed from personal records. These are explicitly identifying in 
nature. There are other types of attributes known as quasi-identifiers (also known as 
pseudo-identifiers) that can be contained in a given data set, which could possibly be 
used to infer the identity of an individual. It can be seen that by combining these 
various attributes in a data set, the possibility of narrowing down the options to a 
smaller group of individuals is possible. A popular example of quasi-identifiers are age, 
zip-code, and gender that are available publicly in census records [44]. 
 
There are two important definitions for k-anonymity that must be reviewed.  
 
The first definition as mentioned in [11]:  
“QI being a quasi-identifier for a given table U with 
T(A1 . . . An), fC : U → T, fg : T →U′, where U ⊆ U′, a quasi-identifier of T(QT) is a set 
of attributes {Ai . . . AJ}⊆ {A1 . . . An}, where ∃pi ∈ U such that fg (fc(pi)[QT]) = pi” 
 
The second definition as stated in [54] :  
“a table T satisfies k-anonymity if for every tuple t ∈ T there exist k − 1 other tuples 
ti1ti2 . . . tk−1 ∈ T such that ti1[C] = ti2[C] = . . . tik−1[C] for all C ∈ QT” 
 
From the definitions above, k-anonymity can, in simple terms, be defined as:  
“Each release of the data must be such that every combination of values of quasi-




Figure 5 below graphically represents the famous example used by Sweeney [56] to 
relink a data subject using quasi-identifiers from two data sets. The data subject in 





Figure 5: Example of relinking individuals from two separate data sets [56] 
 
As was found in the study by Sweeney [56] in 1997, William Weld was the governor 
of Massachusetts when his medical records were contained in the Group Insurance 
Commission(GIC) data set that was released. The GIC collected health insurance for 
government employees in Massachusetts and sold a copy of this health information 
which was perceived to be anonymous [61]. Governor Weld had publicly confirmed 
that identifiers were deleted before release and coincidentally he was hospitalised 
prior to the data release in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Sweeney then purchased the 
voter list which contained names, addresses, and similar information to the GIC data 
set, namely zip code, birthdate, and sex (or gender). When a correlation was done, 
only six people had the same date of birth as Governor Weld with only three of them 
being males.  It was then narrowed down to a single record as he was the only one in 






  Medical Data Voter List 
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The privacy breach above in which medical data that was a part of insurance data that 
already had direct identifiers removed prior to release assisted in identifying Governor 
Weld has had an important impact on the exploration and development of privacy laws 
such as the HIPAA [61]. In the above example, this form of privacy breach is called 
identity disclosure. 
 
Although k-anonymity is a popular method to use to perform data anonymisation due 
to the conceptual simplicity in the application of the algorithm as well as there being 
many algorithms available to perform the anonymisation [44], this privacy model is 
vulnerable to many other types of breaches especially when the attacker has some 
form of background knowledge. Other examples for these types of attacks are taken 
from  [44], [54] and are briefly mentioned below: 
• Homogeneity attacks occur when a sensitive attribute contains the same value 
for all the records for that attribute; therefore, it is easily distinguishable even 
after it is k-anonymised; 
• Background knowledge attacks occur when a link between quasi-identifiers and 
a sensitive attribute enables an attacker to narrow the options of values that are 





The l-diversity privacy model was developed to cater for the shortcomings in the k-
anonymity model [44]. One reason for developing a newer model was that protecting 
the disclosure to the level of k-individuals did not protect the privacy of corresponding 
sensitive values sufficiently, especially so in circumstances where the sensitive values 
were similar [44]. A sensitive attribute (SA) can be described as an attribute for an 
individual in a data set that must be kept confidential and private from people who do 







The first definition of l-diversity as in  [44] states: 
“Let a q∗-block be a set of tuples such that its non-sensitive values generalize to q∗. A 
q∗-block is l-diverse if it contains l ‘well represented’ values for the sensitive attribute 
S. A table is l-diverse, if every q∗- block in it is l-diverse.” 
 
A simpler definition of l-diversity as describe by Machanavajjhala et al [54]: 
“An equivalence class is said to have l-diversity if there are at least l ‘well-represented’ 
values for the sensitive attribute. A table is said to have l-diversity if every equivalence 
class of the table has l-diversity.” 
 
Consequently, the focus of l-diversity is to preserve the diversity amongst the sensitive 
attributes as well as maintain the minimum group size. In this way, l-diversity can 
provide a level of privacy for data when the data publisher is not aware of the 
knowledge that an external adversary might know [54]. L-diversity provides privacy by 
ensuring that values of sensitive attributes are well balanced and dispersed in such a 
way that privacy breaches can be prevented. 
 
The l-diversity privacy model also has limitations. The first limitation pertaining to l-
diversity is its inadequacy in the way it assumes adversarial knowledge. As the 
research by [62] indicated, if an adversary has knowledge of the global distribution of 
a sensitive attribute, it is possible to find out specific information on an individual within 
that group.  
 
The second limitation of the l-diversity privacy model is its inadequacy in preventing 
attribute disclosure. Below are two types of attacks that can occur when using the l-
diversity privacy model [63]: 
• Skewness Attack: occurs when the distribution of a data set is skewed as a 
result of applying the l-diversity privacy model. There l-diversity is not enough 
to prevent attribute disclosure.  
 
• Similarity Attack: occurs when the sensitive attributes are very similar although 
they are distinct. Important knowledge can be gained from the similarities found 




Due to the fact that l-diversity aims to diversify the sensitive values in a data set, 
sensitive information can unintentionally be leaked due to the semantic closeness of 
the sensitive values in the group [62]. 
 
3.3.3 T-closeness  
 
A newer privacy model, the t-closeness algorithm, was developed to address 
vulnerabilities that were identified in previously mentioned privacy models.  
 
According to [64],  the application of k -anonymity and l-diversity is often not adequate 
for the protection of  numerical attributes. As in the example of the attribute for a salary 
of an individual, even if l -diversity is fulfilled, sensitive information can still be revealed 
if the salary values fall within a narrow range which still, therefore, leaks personal 
information. 
 
According to [62], in the t-closeness privacy model, the distribution of a sensitive 
attribute must be similar to that same attribute’s distribution in the entire data set. By 
doing this, specific sensitive information can still be protected. 
Therefore, the distance between the two distributions should be no more than a 
threshold (t). [62] also proposed using the Earth Mover Distance measure for t-
closeness. In order to introduce and manage gaps between values of sensitive 
attributes, t-closeness uses the Earth Mover Distance metric [64]. It receives the 
precise distance between two distributions and takes into consideration the semantic 
closeness. This method allows the data collector to use other anonymisation 
techniques besides generalisation and suppression [65]. 
 
3.3.4 Privacy Model Selection 
 
It can clearly be seen from the above that each privacy model has advantages as well 
as disadvantages. A choice of a privacy model for a particular purpose differs from 
scenario to scenario. As a result, there is no clear method to determine the appropriate 
data anonymisation privacy model to be used for this study.  
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3.4 Generalisation Hierarchies  
 
Generalisation hierarchies are typically used in de-identifying data sets with personally 
identifiable information. During the anonymisation of data quasi-identifier attributes are 
transformed in such a way that privacy needs are met. This data transformation (called 
recoding) is mainly done with the use of generalisation hierarchies. 
 
As seen in Table 2 previously, when generalising values of the attribute Age, the 
values are transformed into groups by age and thereafter suppressed, whereas the 
attribute Gender was only suppressed. The result was a generalised hierarchy as 
shown in Figure 3. Generalisation hierarchies are used primarily for categorical 
attributes [12], but can also be used for continuous attributes by performing 
categorisation.  
 
Defining bigger intervals (fewer levels of hierarchies) will decrease the risk of re-
identification; however, if this attribute is relevant for an analysis, defining bigger 
intervals will result in the data set losing utility [12].  In brief, care must be taken when 
generalisation hierarchies are first created. 
 
Due to the importance of generalisation hierarchies when anonymising data using k-
anonymity, in this study the focus is on attribute generalisation by using user-specified 
hierarchies. User-specified hierarchies are used to describe the rules for replacing 
values with more general but semantically consistent values on increasing levels of 
generalisation. 
 
3.5 Anonymisation Tools 
 
This section presents an overview of common anonymisation tools that are available 
on the market. These tools are either open-source or commercially available products 
that need to be purchased and require a licence. A comprehensive overview of each 





3.5.1 ARX Anonymisation Tool 
 
The ARX anonymisation tool [66] is an open source software tool that can be used to 
anonymise personal information into a form that can be shared with the appropriate 
level of anonymisation already applied. ARX has been primarily created for the use of 
de-identifying biomedical data and is the most comprehensive tool for applying a 
variety of anonymisation methods [55]. 
 
ARX is highly configurable and a few of the important characteristics of ARX are 
highlighted below:  
• ARX can implement a variety of privacy models, some of which are k-
anonymity, t-closeness, l-diversity, and l-presence; 
• A key characteristic of ARX is that it minimises disclosure risk whilst also 
reducing information loss on the data output; 
• Utility measures can compare the outputs of various data transformations that 
are performed. Information loss as a measure is directly an opposite measure 
of utility [12]; 
• ARX has a user-friendly intuitive graphical interface; 
• ARX is capable of importing data from various sources, for example comma 
separate value (CSV) files, Microsoft Excel files as well as Microsoft SQL 
Server, just to name a few. 
 
Within ARX, data is transformed using generalisation hierarchies [58]. This is done by 
using a wizard to build the required generalisation hierarchies. The process of 
creating, modifying and managing hierarchies are easy to do in ARX. Privacy models 
and coding models are also easy to adjust according to the user needs. 
 
The use of a graphical interface to show the statistical results is very useful to users 
who are new to data anonymisation. A side-by-side view of the original data set next 
to the anonymised data set shows a visual representation of the differences to the 
data post-anonymisation. Also, after the anonymisation is complete, the risk analysis 
can easily be done with the built-in view. An important aspect is that the view shows 
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details relating to the estimated re-identification risks as a result of running 
anonymisation using the different privacy models.  
 
3.5.2 Other Anonymisation Tools 
 
Tools for de-identifying data are available on the market according to specified 
needs. As described in [67], there are five generally available de-identification tools 
in the market, but this list is constantly expanding as it is an ever-growing field: 
• The PARAT tool from Privacy Analytics Inc. 
• The μ-Argus tool, from the Netherlands National Statistical Agency. 
• The Cornell Anonymisation Toolkit (CAT), also called Incognito implemented 
by Cornell University 
• The University of Texas (Dallas) (UTD) Anonymisation Toolbox 
• The sdcMicro package in R  
This following section provides a brief overview of each of the tools mentioned above.   
 
3.5.3 Privacy Analytics Risk Assessment Tool (PARAT) 
Privacy Analytics Risk Assessment Tool (PARAT) from Privacy Analytics Inc. is one 
of the most popular de-identification software tools on the market. Only limited details 
are available publicly as it is closed-source [5]. PARAT has been used by seven of the 
top ten Fortune 500 healthcare companies [68]. The PARAT tool offers protection and 
privacy for three types of identity disclosure risks. 
 
PARAT supports a Windows platform and is compatible with various database types 
such as Microsoft SQL databases and Oracle databases. There are multiple steps for 
the anonymisation process in PARAT. Firstly, indirect identifiers are specified in a data 
set. Thereafter, a re-identification risk threshold is selected. PARAT then does a risk 
analysis on the proposed re-identification risk using three attacker models, namely 
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prosecutor attacker model, journalist attacker model and marketer attacker model. 
Finally, the re-identification risk is reduced to an acceptable level by applying various 
de-identification techniques[69]. A recent version of PARAT version 6.0 was released 
in 2014 [68]. 
 
3.5.4 μ-Argus 
μ-Argus is a closed-source software tool that implements various popular techniques 
[67]. It was developed by Statistic Netherlands. The name “Argus” is an acronym for 
"Anti-Re-identification General Utility System" [69]. The software supports Windows 
and Linux Ubuntu and was developed by the European Union within the 
Computational Aspects of Statistical Confidentiality project. The most recent version 
5.1.3 was released in March 2018 [70]. 
 
According to [69], the first step in the process is to identify indirect identifiers in a data 
set. The software then determines the re-identification risk for each record in the data 
set. Rarity of the population within the data set is estimated and the risk of re-
identification based on available combinations of variables is calculated. Lastly, unsafe 
combinations of variables are identified, and manual global recoding done. As soon 
as the number of unsafe combinations has been reduced, local suppression is 
performed on the remaining unsafe combinations to remove them. 
 
3.5.5 Cornell Anonymisation Toolkit (CAT)  
In 2009 a group of students from Cornell University developed the Incognito Algorithm. 
Subsequently it was named the Cornell Anonymisation Toolkit (CAT) and made 
publicly available. Incognito implements a k-anonymity algorithm and takes into 
consideration all possible subsets of the indirect identifiers [71]. It was developed by 
Kristen LeFevre.  
 
According to [69], given a data set that contains three quasi-identifiers or variables, for 
example age, date of birth, and gender, the Incognito algorithm would take into 
consideration the variables separately as well as a combination of the variables 
together. It then determines if any of these values identify unique or rare combinations 
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that could be explicitly identifying. Thereafter it uses optimisations to speed up its 
calculations. This allows for the practical application of larger data sets to be possible.  
 
3.5.6 The University of Texas (Dallas) (UTD) Anonymisation Toolbox 
The UTD Anonymisation Toolbox is an open source Java software tool that 
incorporates algorithms for k-anonymity and attribute disclosure control. In 2012, the 
most recent version was released [72] which incorporated a graphical user interface 
for researchers to easily arrange parameters of the available anonymisation 
algorithms. In addition, this version introduced an application programming interface 
(API) for developers. The new API enabled integration of anonymisation algorithms 
into various privacy-preserving data processing applications. As of the most recent 
release, the toolbox only supported unstructured text files (also called American 
Standard Code for Information Interchange [ASCII files]) which was an immediate 
disadvantage in comparison to the other tools available [73]. 
 
3.5.7 The sdcMicro package in R 
The statistical disclosure control (sdcMicro) package provides some basic de-
identification functions.  sdcMicro was developed as a package for use within the R 
statistics software. The intention was for it to not run independently as a standalone 
application like other anonymisation tools [74]. Like other anonymisation tools, 
sdcMicro also contains a graphical user interface; however, functionality is limited. It 
only incorporates the k-anonymity and ℓ-diversity privacy models [5]. 
 
3.5.8 Anonymisation Tool Selection 
 
Figure 6 below shows a comparison of the various tools mentioned in the previous 
section against the support, usability, and anonymity criteria [5]. Depending on the use 





Figure 6: Comparison of anonymisation tools [5] 
 
ARX was selected as the tool of choice for this study. A key reason for using ARX is 
that it is open source and freely available to all users.  Another feature is that ARX can 
measure utility of a data set by comparing the results of different transformations, 
which was an important factor in considering the choice of tool. This functionality will 
allow for the measurement of information loss as a result of anonymisation. These two 
features are integral to evaluate the hypothesis proposed.   
 
Furthermore, an outcome of the research was to measure the success of using a data 
anonymisation tool, specifically to ensure POPI-compliant data, as well as to 
determine whether the k-anonymity privacy model or l-diversity privacy model is the 
preferred model to use to achieve POPI compliance of a given customer data set. ARX 
supports both privacy models. 
 
3.6 Data Privacy Measures 
 
When trying to resolve data privacy issues, two parameters must be taken into 
consideration. Firstly, there is a need to measure data utility, and secondly, to estimate 
the privacy risk of the output data set after anonymisation. Attacker models can be 






3.6.1 Data Utility 
 
When using data for data mining purposes, the process of privacy-preservation and 
transforming data can reduce data quality which in turn can lead to a loss of 
information [55]. Subsequently, this loss of information can also be attributed to a loss 
of utility when comparing the output data set to the original data set. However, a key 
trade-off when it comes to data utility is how to preserve as much utility as possible 
while still retaining privacy levels [1] . 
 
The issue with utility-based privacy-preserving data mining was first studied formally 
in [40]. This study determined that the aim of privacy-preserving data publishing was 
to maximise “good utility” whilst at the same time reduce the ability for the identification 
of individuals in a data set. The study also proposed the separation of publishing 
marginal tables that have attributes which retain utility which are at the same time a 
problem for preserving and maintaining privacy [40].  
 
Furthermore, in some studies, negative results related to dimensionality suggest that 
there needs to be a suppression of certain attributes to preserve privacy [7]. However, 
careful consideration must be taken to ensure that privacy preservation is done in a 
way to preserve utility. Therefore, it is important to understand what measures of utility 
are available so that the level of usefulness of the resultant output data set can be 
measured. 
 
3.6.2 Utility Metrics 
 
In this section, the available utility metrics that measure data utility are discussed. A 
brief description of each utility measure is also provided. In subsequent chapters, 
those utility measures that are in scope for this study are further highlighted. 
 
The following important data utility measures are available:  
• Discernibility Metric (DM) is based on the equivalence class size and involves 
introducing a penalty for suppressed records [76]. 
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• Average Equivalence Class Size (AECS) measures the average size of 
groups of records that are unable to be identified and measures the equivalence 
class size. Average equivalence class size is also known as average class size 
[77][75]. 
• The Precision measure, introduced by Latanya Sweeney, summarises the 
level of generalisation applied to all attribute values [11]. 
• Information Loss (IL) was initially proposed by Iyengar et al. and measures 
the granularity of the data by determining the coverage of an attribute's domain 
that is contained in the transformed values [75] [78].  
• Non-Uniform Entropy was first proposed by Gionis and Tassa [59]. It 
“computes a distance between the distribution of attribute values in an 
anonymised data set and the distribution of attribute values in the original data 
set” [79]. 
• Classification Metric (CM) applies when tuples are “assigned a categorical 
class label in an effort to produce anonymisations whose induced equivalence 
classes consist of tuples that are uniform with respect to the class label” [76]. 
Another definition of the Classification Metric is it is the sum of the individual 
penalties for each row in the table normalised by the total number of rows [78]. 
 
3.6.3 Attacker Models 
 
When it comes to the measurement of privacy risks, attacker models are used. There 
are three different attacker models available [75]. 
 
The first attacker model is the prosecutor model. In this model the assumption is that 
the attacker is already aware that the respondent in part of the data set. The second 
attacker model is the journalist model where background information about the 
respondent is not known by the attacker. The third attacker model is the marketer 
model where the aim is to attack a larger number of individuals in a data set and not 







This chapter commenced with a discussion of the concepts of privacy models and 
anonymisation techniques and privacy threats. A brief overview of the various 
anonymisation tools was then outlined in order to provide context for the selection of 
a tool. Finally, data privacy regarding data utility and attacker models was discussed. 




4 DESIGN  
 
Having shown the reader the numerous privacy models and techniques that can be 
used to perform data anonymisation in the previous chapter, a reference was made to 
the tools available which incorporate these privacy models as part of the software. The 
ARX anonymisation tool was selected in the last chapter. However, it must be 
mentioned that the approach is generic such that it can be used with any 
anonymisation tool of choice. 
 
In this chapter, an overview of the research methodology and approach used in this 
study will be presented. This is crucial to validate the hypothesis outlined in the first 
chapter. Firstly, an examination of the characteristics, architecture, privacy models, 
and utility measures that are incorporated as part of the tool are presented. The data 
set and environment where the practical application of the anonymisation tool and the 
relevant setup of the environment is then explained to ensure a proper evaluation 
using a suitable approach to meet the aim of the study. Finally, a simple workflow to 
show the anonymisation process that will be followed is presented. 
 
4.1 Research Methodology 
 
In this section the research methodology carried out in this study is described. The 
methodology will show which method was used to test the hypothesis, the data 
collection and analysis thereof, as well as a justification on why the particular 
methodology was chosen.  
 
4.1.1 Research Method 
For this study, the technique chosen was to perform an experiment which is based 
within quantitative research design.  Experiments are used to investigate causal 
relationships using tests controlled by the researcher [80]. In this study, an experiment 
was used to test the hypothesis where data anonymisation had to be carried out on a 
data set representing realistic customer data. As a result of the experiment, it was then 
possible to test the cause-and-effect relationship of the two privacy models 
implemented against each other with regards to privacy and data utility measures. To 
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do this, a data set was imported into a software tool, ARX, was configured for purposes 
of testing the hypothesis and thereafter evaluation of the results. The results of each 
privacy model were measured and reported on. 
 
4.1.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Quantitative data was used in this study as hypothesis testing and understanding of 
anonymisation using privacy models were required [81]. The data set was obtained 
from the AdventureWorks 2016 Microsoft database that simulates a product sampling 
data warehouse supporting online transaction processing (OLTP) processing. Within 
the database resides information for a fictitious company called Adventure Works 
Cycles that manufactures bicycles [82]. 
 
In addition, data used in this study was specifically obtained from the customer 
(dim.customer) table within the AdventureWorks database. The reason this data was 
used as the sample was because it contains the structure, schema, and columns of a 
real-life customer database that a banking institution could have. Due to the nature of 
the testing performed, un-transformed and raw data was needed to accurately 
represent the sample population. 
 
Below is an outline of the basic properties of the AdventureWorks data set used in this 
study: 
 
• Data set Name: AdventureWorks 2016 
• Data set Origination: Microsoft SQL sample data warehouse  
• Data set Location: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sql/samples/adventureworks-install-configure?view=sql-server-2017  
• Data set Records: The complete data set contains 18,484 records. 
• Data set File Size: The file sizes are 3095KB 
• Data set File Format: Excel CSV file exported from a SQL database 
 
In this study an important note to make is the distinction of the type of data that was 
used: the data was a static, structured, well-defined, textual, single-level data set. The 
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reason being is that for the POPI principle “Security Safeguards and Controls” there 
is a need for the data set that is being anonymised to be as close to real life data as 
possible, and which would typically reside in an organisations database[10]. Further 
definitions of these terms are described below to ensure clarity on the type of data that 
was tested [83]: 
 
• Static refers to data that is not changing and is available completely when the 
anonymisation process is done. This is in contrast with streaming data where 
new data is constantly available. As a result, it is important to note that other 
anonymisation techniques may be needed for streaming data that is not 
described further in this study.  
 
• Structured refers to data that is formatted properly and located in a known 
location. 
 
• Well-defined relates to when the data set conformed to pre-defined rules as 
with the case of relational databases.   
 
• Textual data refers to values that represent data that is alphanumeric in form, 
for example text, numbers, dates, etc. Anonymisation techniques for streaming 
data like audio, video, images, etc. create additional challenges and are not in 
the scope of this study.  
 
• Single-level refers to data relating to various individuals with only one entry 
(and not multiple entries) per individual. 
 
The AdventureWorks 2016 database backup file was downloaded from the link as 
mentioned above and installed in the SQL Server environment. The “dimcustomer” 
table was then exported to a CSV file. This resulted in 18,484 unique customer 
records. 
 
The data set in total comprised 29 attributes. Table 3 refers to the entire data set. 
However, in this study the following 19 attributes from the dimcustomer data set were 
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used in the data anonymisation process. These are marked in the table below as 
“Yes”. 
 
Table 3: Data set Attributes for dimcustomer Table 
Number Attribute Included in 
Anonymisation 
1 CustomerKey Yes 
2 GeographyKey No 
3 CustomerAlternateKey No 
4 Title No 
5 FirstName Yes 
6 MiddleName Yes 
7 LastName Yes 
8 NameStyle No 
9 BirthDate Yes 
10 MaritalStatus Yes 
11 Suffix No 
12 Gender Yes 
13 EmailAddress Yes 
14 YearlyIncome Yes 
15 TotalChildren Yes 
16 NumberChildrenAtHome Yes 
17 EnglishEducation Yes 
18 SpanishEducation No 
19 FrenchEducation No 
20 EnglishOccupation Yes 
21 SpanishOccupation No 
22 FrenchOccupation No 
23 HouseOwnerFlag Yes 
24 NumberCarsOwned Yes 
25 AddressLine1 Yes 
26 AddressLine2 No 
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27 Phone Yes 
28 DateFirstPurchase Yes 
29 CommuteDistance Yes 
 
 
As shown above, the data set represented a realistic customer data set that could be 
used as the data required in this study. As the dataset contained information from the 
data warehouse sample scenario, the data was clear, concise and fit for purpose. 
There were 18,484 unique customer record which represented a sample size that was 
adequate for purposes of this study.  Furthermore, the 19 attributes selected were 
based on characteristics that was needed to show the anonymisation of various types 
of identifiers e.g. string, integer, date/time as well as represent customer data that 




An experiment was used primarily because the software tool selected could accurately 
compare the results of two anonymisation techniques within a closed environment 
using the same set of data and report the results empirically. An important 
consideration for using an experiment with a software tool built for the purpose of 
anonymising data was that the hypothesis could be tested in a practical way, which 
was important to the study, and therefore show meaningful results. The results could 
then also be represented in a tabular and graphic form, which would assist in showing 
the results of this study more clearly. Further details on the configuration of the 
software environment is shown later in this chapter. 
 
 
4.2 ARX Characteristics 
 
There are many commercial tools available that can be implemented which can 
transform a data set into an anonymised or de-identified data set  [67]. Many of these 
tools are either open source or commercially available requiring a licence for use. A 




All experiments in this study were performed using the open source data 
anonymisation tool ARX, which was configured to use local generalisation. ARX allows 
the user to amend and change personally-identifying information (PII) data so that it 
can be shared. ARX is an anonymisation tool which has been developed specifically 
for the biomedical and health industry [42].  
 
As the tool selected for this study plays a critical role in de-identifying a data set, the 
following advantages and disadvantages have been noted: 
4.2.1 Advantages of ARX 
• Contains a graphical user interface (GUI) that is easy to use with minimal 
training [66];  
• Can visually guide the user step-by-step through the anonymisation process 
[66]; 
• Is highly configurable and scalable so that the implementation of anonymisation 
methods can be increased with a growth in future use cases as required [52]; 
• Independent API to be used separate to the GUI in a Java environment [5]. 
 
4.2.2 Disadvantages of ARX 
• Knowledge of how to configure the various privacy models is required; 
• Does not have functionality for data cleansing; 
• Future work planned to incorporate differential privacy algorithms; 
• Limited risk assessment models; 
• The quasi-identifiers required in the k-anonymity and l-diversity privacy models 
are quite difficult to specify beforehand as it is not known what information is 
available to adversaries [39]. 
 
ARX has a comprehensive list of supported privacy models for anonymising structured 
data. Basic risk analysis and risk-based anonymisation can be performed within ARX. 
Syntactic privacy models are catered for including various methods that allow for the 
automatic and manual analysis of the utility of the data. A key goal of ARX is to obtain 
data sets that comply with syntactic privacy models whilst at the same time reduce 




4.3 ARX Architecture 
 
In this section a brief overview of the architecture developed within ARX is shown.  
As described in [5], the subsystems within the framework are tightly coupled to ensure 
extensibility. All the modules mentioned below can be used either with the API or the 
graphical user interface. Figure 7 below shows the full architecture layout of ARX, with 
a few key descriptions of the modules as well. 
 
 
Figure 7: ARX High-Level Architecture Layout [5] 
 
The following four core modules, which forms the basis of how ARX works, from [5] 
are: 
1. The I/O modules, which enables the read/write of data to external drives; 
2. The data encoding module, in which the data is transformed into the correct 
memory layout and format;  
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3. The data management module, that implements optimisation and internal 
representation of the data elements; and 
4. The operators that deal with data record grouping and perform computations of 
frequency distribution over sensitive attributes. 
 
The above are the core modules of ARX, however, the following extensible modules 
also form part of the tool: 
1. Privacy criteria 
2. Data utility 
3. Anonymisation algorithms 
 
The privacy criteria are implemented as well as the metrics for measuring data utility. 
Functionality for anonymisation algorithms to plug into the framework is also catered 
for. 
4.4 ARX Privacy Models  
 
In Section 3.3 Privacy Models, the list of the most common privacy models was 
discussed. In this section, a choice of privacy models that are available in ARX are 
selected for this study. 
 
To review on previous work, ARX supports a variety of privacy models, namely 
syntactic privacy models, statistical privacy models as well as semantic privacy models 
[66]. Examples of specific models and types are shown in Table 4 below: 
 
Table 4: Privacy Model Types [66] 
Syntactic Privacy 
Models 
Statistical Privacy Models Semantic Privacy Models 
k-anonymity 
 
k-map (ε, δ)-differential privacy 




t-closeness Methods based on super-
population models 
 
δ-disclosure privacy   
β-likeness    
δ-presence   
 
In an effort to prevent data privacy breaches, syntactic privacy models are applied on 
a particular data set. In this study, the proposed hypothesis requires an evaluation of 
privacy models to ensure that the utility results and the privacy risks of the data set 
post-anonymisation can be measured.  
To this end, in this study the following privacy models were selected: 
• K-anonymity privacy model 
• L-diversity privacy model 
4.5 ARX Utility Measures 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in data anonymisation, utility measures are 
used to automatically compare data transformations to determine an optimal solution 
for the anonymisation whilst still maintaining utility.  
 
Quality models are used to quantify the measurement for data quality [55]. In order to 
measure utility for this study, data quality models are implemented on the anonymised 
data.  As a result, the data quality, and in turn data utility, is measured and reported. 
 
The following attribute-level quality models are implemented within ARX in this study: 
• Granularity 
• Precision 
• Squared Error 
• Non-Uniform Entropy 
 
The following data set-level quality models were applied in this study: 
o Discernibility  
o Ambiguity 
o Average class size  
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o Record-level squared error 
 
4.6 Experimental Environment 
 
The experimental evaluation was setup on the following environment. The computing 
hardware was an Intel Core i5-5350U CPU @ 1.80GHz with 8GB of RAM installed.  
 
The operating system installed was Windows 10 64-bit. 
 
The anonymisation tool ARX Version 3.7.1 was installed. This version was released 
on 3 August 2018. 
 
4.7 Data Identifiers 
 
Within the ARX tool the various types of data identifiers are supported. These data 
identifiers are allocated to each attribute to allow for the appropriate anonymisation to 
be performed. 
 
ARX supports the following attribute types with its relevant transformation method: 
• Identifying attributes are the most obvious and will be taken out from the data 
set; 
• Transformation will be applied to quasi-identifying attributes which together in 
some way are used to identify records; 
• Sensitive attributes can be protected using privacy models, such as t-closeness 
or l-diversity or remain as-is and not transformed; 
• Insensitive attributes are not changed in any way. 
 
In this study, the following attribute types have been assigned to each attribute in the 






Table 5: Attribute Types per Attribute 
Number Attribute Attribute Type 
1 CustomerKey Identifying 
2 FirstName Identifying 
3 MiddleName Identifying 
4 LastName Identifying 
5 BirthDate Quasi-identifier 
6 MaritalStatus Quasi-identifier 
7 Gender Quasi-identifier 
8 EmailAddress Identifying 
9 YearlyIncome Quasi-identifier 
10 TotalChildren Quasi-identifier 
11 NumberChildrenAtHome Quasi-identifier 
12 EnglishEducation Quasi-identifier 
13 EnglishOccupation Sensitive 
14 HouseOwnerFlag Quasi-identifier 
15 NumberCarsOwned Quasi-identifier 
16 AddressLine1 Identifying 
17 Phone Identifying 
18 DateFirstPurchase Quasi-identifier 
19 CommuteDistance Insensitive 
 
4.8 Data Transformation Methods 
 
4.8.1 Generalisation Hierarchies 
 
Within ARX, generalisation hierarchies can be manually created or semi-automatically 
created. Common attribute types, such as numerical (discrete or continuous) and 
categorical variables can be created partially automatically. Values are grouped by a 
natural or user-defined method thereby creating hierarchies. These are mapped using 




Generalisation hierarchies can be specified in two ways: 
1. Using the built-in wizards 
2. Importing and exporting hierarchy specifications 
 
As the use of hierarchies is performed when using k-anonymity, further details on the 
various types of generalisation hierarchies are detailed below. 
 
ARX supports four types of hierarchies when created automatically using the wizard: 
• Masking-based hierarchies are used for various attribute types; 
• Interval-based hierarchies are used for values with a ratio scale; 
• Order-based hierarchies are used for values on an ordinal scale; 
• Date-based hierarchies can be used for data ranges. 
 
In this study, the following data transformation methods were applied to the attributes 
as shown in the Table 6 below. Where generalisation or suppression was used it was 
specifically mentioned below: 
 
Table 6: Data Transformation Type per Attribute 
Number Attribute Data Transformation 
1 CustomerKey Suppression 
2 FirstName Suppression 
3 MiddleName Suppression 
4 LastName Suppression 
5 BirthDate Date Based Generalisation Hierarchy 
6 MaritalStatus Generalisation 
7 Gender Generalisation 
8 EmailAddress Suppression 
9 YearlyIncome Generalisation 
10 TotalChildren Generalisation 
11 NumberChildrenAtHome Generalisation 
12 EnglishEducation Generalisation 
13 EnglishOccupation BLANK 
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14 HouseOwnerFlag Generalisation 
15 NumberCarsOwned Generalisation 
16 AddressLine1 Suppression 
17 Phone Suppression 
18 DateFirstPurchase Generalisation 
19 CommuteDistance None 
 
4.9 Attribute Metadata 
 
Attribute metadata relates to the types of data that a single attribute would represent. 
It is critical that the correct attribute data type is selected when using the built-in wizard 
for transformations. If not, inappropriate anonymisation could occur as a result. 
 
ARX supports the following data types: string, integer, decimal, date/time, and ordinal. 
 
In this study the following data types have been specified for the attributes in the data 
set shown in Table 7: 
 
Table 7:  Data Type per Attribute 
Number Attribute Data Types 
1 CustomerKey Integer 
2 FirstName String 
3 MiddleName String 
4 LastName String 
5 BirthDate Date/Time 
6 MaritalStatus String 
7 Gender String 
8 EmailAddress String 
9 YearlyIncome Integer 
10 TotalChildren Integer 
11 NumberChildrenAtHome Integer 
12 EnglishEducation String 
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13 EnglishOccupation String 
14 HouseOwnerFlag Integer 
15 NumberCarsOwned Integer 
16 AddressLine1 String 
17 Phone String 
18 DateFirstPurchase Date/Time 
19 CommuteDistance String 
 
 
4.9.1 Data Cleansing 
Data imported into ARX cannot be changed; however, it does contain mechanisms to 
identify data quality issues by sorting the data, comparing, and analysing the data. A 
query can also be used to find records with data quality issues [5]. 
 
If there is a need for intense data clean up, this must be done outside of ARX and then 
imported for anonymisation to be performed. 
 
In this study, the data set was not modified or cleansed to ensure that a realistic 
experiment sample was used. 
 
4.10 Anonymisation Workflow 
 
The steps to perform data anonymisation are available in ARX. These various steps 
are put together in a multi-step process which allows a user to adjust the parameters 
iteratively as required, until the output matches their need as shown in Figure 8 [5]. 
  
 




The three steps from the above anonymisation workflow are mapped to four 
perspectives in the ARX user interface [52] shown in Figure 9 below. This graphical 
user interface, using the perspectives as a guideline, is used to model different aspects 
of the anonymisation process end-to-end [66].  
 
 
Figure 9: ARX Implementation Workflow Perspectives [66] 
 
The workflow perspectives in Figure 9 above are used in this study to evaluate the 
hypothesis. In the following section a brief summary of each step, with its associated 
functionality, are described. 
 
4.10.1 Configure 
In the configuration phase, data is loaded, and the generalisation hierarchies are 
created or imported. Privacy models are selected and configured as well as utility 
measures specified. Lastly, transformation methods are configured [5]. After the 
configuration steps have been completed, the data can be anonymised.  
 
4.10.2 Explore 
In the exploration phase, the solution space (after the anonymisation has been 
completed) can be examined to look for data transformations that preserve privacy as 
well as meet the user  needs [5]. An overview of possible solutions can be inspected 
in the exploration perspective. ARX also contains functionality to automatically 
propose a solution of choice. 
 
4.10.3 Utility Analysis 
In the analysis phase, a comparison of the input data as well as the transformed output 
data can be done. This is done so that the utility of the data can be assessed. Data 
utility is also analysed at this stage automatically using utility measures and metrics 
that are built into ARX [52]. Details of these utility metrics and utility measures were 




4.10.4 Risk Analysis 
In the fourth perspective, different views of risk analysis on the output data can be 
seen. The risks associated with individual quasi-identifiers present in the data set as 
well as the distribution of class sizes are shown. Importantly, this view also displays 
details about estimated re-identification risks obtained from different models that are 
implemented when anonymising the data [52]. As a result, privacy risks can be 
analysed for an input data set as well as transformed output data. 
 
In summary, based on the results of the various analyses that can be performed, the 
suitability of a solution candidate may either be confirmed, or the parameters of the 




As mentioned in this chapter, the approach and method for the testing of the 
hypothesis was presented. Details of the tool, ARX, was provided together with a view 
of the data set and its relevant attributes. The data transformation methods and 
workflows showed how the anonymisation process would be used to anonymise the 
data. In the next chapter the implementation of the design mentioned in this chapter 






Having shown in the previous chapter the design of the anonymisation tool that was 
done, in this chapter these designs are implemented. Here the configuration of the 
anonymisation process steps are performed. Firstly, the setup of the environment is 
done to ensure an optimal testing environment.  
Thereafter, seeing that ARX has a useful graphical user interface to guide the setup, 
the configuration of ARX is shown with screens of each step. Lastly the specific data 
anonymisation settings like privacy models, utility measures, and attribute properties 
are configured. 
 
5.1 Environment Setup 
 
5.1.1 AdventureWorks Data set 
 
The AdventureWorks2016 data set was downloaded directly from the Microsoft site at 





The data warehouse file version AdventureWorksdW2016.bak was downloaded. 
 
5.1.2 Database Server 
 
Microsoft SQL Server 2016 was then installed in Evaluation mode. This was done so 
that the AdventureWorks backup database could be imported into the database 
server, and thereafter the customer information could be extracted. 
 
The following SQL Server configuration was created in MS SQL Server 2016: 
• Server Name : SAGREN 




5.1.3 Database Server Management Tool 
 
SQL Server Management Studio (SSMS) version 2014 was installed as it is a tool to 
configure, monitor, and administer instances of SQL Server and databases. SSMS 
was used to restore the downloaded version of the AdventureWork2016 data 
warehouse. Default settings were selected upon installation to perform the restore. 
 
Once the database was restored, all customer records from the dim.customer table 
within the AdventureWorks2016 database was extracted in an Excel file. Table 8 
below shows the details of the dim.customer table. 
 
Table 8: AdventureWorks Database Detail 
AdventureWorks2016 
Database Name AdventureWorks2016 
Table dim.customer 
Rows 18,484 
Columns 20  
 
5.2 ARX Setup 
 
ARX version 3.7.1 was downloaded from the product website 
https://arx.deidentifier.org/ and installed. 
The default settings as proposed during the setup were chosen when installing ARX. 
Once installed, a new project was created and saved in preparation for the data set 
proposed in this study to be imported to.  
 
5.3 Configuring ARX 
 
In this section, the data set was loaded and the privacy models with the generalisation 
hierarchy were configured. The various transformation models are specified for the 
anonymisation process. Once the anonymisation process was completed the solution 
space can be viewed to organise transformations that have been automatically 
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proposed. Figure 10 below shows an overview of the steps in configuring the 





Figure 10: Configuration Perspective 
 
5.3.1 Input Data Set 
 
At this stage, the ARX tool was installed with a new project environment created. 
Furthermore, the data from the AdventureWorks2016 dim.customer table was 
imported using the built-in import wizard. 
 





Figure 11: View of imported records in the data set 
 
The following columns (attributes) from the dim.customer table were imported and are 










Table 9: ARX Input Data Attributes 
 
 
The following ten attributes were not imported. This is because these columns either 




































Specific records within a data set can also be selected for anonymisation, therefore, it 
specifies which records are contained in the project sample. However, for this study, 
and as shown in Table 9 above, all 18,484 records were imported. 
 
5.3.2 Specifying Attribute Properties: Attribute Metadata  
 
After the data set has been imported, the attribute metadata was configured. This is 
where the datatype for each attribute is set together with the format. Figure 12 below 
shows the configuration of each attribute datatype in the data set. 
 
 




5.3.3 Specifying Attribute Properties: Data Transformation 
The type of an attribute can be set within the “Data Transformation” tab. The type of 
an attribute can be specified together with the transformation method to be applied to 
the data.  
 
5.3.3.1 Attribute Type 
To recap from the previous chapter, the data will be transformed according to the rules 
for the attribute types as below: 
• Identifying attributes are the most obvious and will be taken out from the data 
set; 
• Transformation will be applied to quasi-identifying attributes which together in 
some way is used to identify records; 
• Sensitive attributes can be protected using privacy models, such as t-closeness 
or l-diversity or remain as-is and not transformed; 
• Insensitive attributes are not changed in any way. 
 
As shown below in Table 10,  the following attribute types were set for each field: 
 
Table 10: Configuration of Attribute Types 
Number Attribute Attribute Type 
1 CustomerKey Identifying 
2 FirstName Identifying 
3 MiddleName Identifying 
4 LastName Identifying 
5 BirthDate Quasi-identifier 
6 MaritalStatus Quasi-identifier 
7 Gender Quasi-identifier 
8 EmailAddress Identifying 
9 YearlyIncome Quasi-identifier 
10 TotalChildren Quasi-identifier 
11 NumberChildrenAtHome Quasi-identifier 





5.3.3.2 Attribute Transformation 
 
ARX includes the following transformation methods: generalisation, micro 
aggregation, and suppression. Attribute types that are identifying are automatically 
supressed. Attribute types that are quasi-identifiers have been generalised using 
generalisation hierarchies.  
 
The full details of the data transformation type per attribute are shown in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Configuration of Attribute Transformation 
Number Attribute Data Transformation 
1 CustomerKey Suppression 
2 FirstName Suppression 
3 MiddleName Suppression 
4 LastName Suppression 
5 BirthDate Date Based Generalisation Hierarchy 
6 MaritalStatus Generalisation 
7 Gender Generalisation 
8 EmailAddress Suppression 
9 YearlyIncome Generalisation 
10 TotalChildren Generalisation 
11 NumberChildrenAtHome Generalisation 
12 EnglishEducation Generalisation 
13 EnglishOccupation Sensitive 
14 HouseOwnerFlag Quasi-identifier 
15 NumberCarsOwned Quasi-identifier 
16 AddressLine1 Identifying 
17 Phone Identifying 
18 DateFirstPurchase Quasi-identifier 
19 CommuteDistance InSensitive 
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13 EnglishOccupation Blank 
14 HouseOwnerFlag Generalisation 
15 NumberCarsOwned Generalisation 
16 AddressLine1 Suppression 
17 Phone Suppression 
18 DateFirstPurchase Generalisation 
19 CommuteDistance None 
 
5.3.4 Configure Privacy Models 
 
In this section, the configuration of the two privacy models, namely k-anonymity and l-
diversity, are shown.  
 
5.3.4.1 K-anonymity Configuration 
 
For the project, the first privacy model k-anonymity was selected from the list of 
available privacy models. Within the configuration of k-anonymity, the value for k must 
be specified. This study was configured for 2 anonymity where k = 2. Refer to Figure 
13 for the screen detail. 
 
 
Figure 13: K-anonymity Privacy Model Configuration 
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5.3.4.2 L-diversity Configuration 
 
The l-diversity privacy model was thereafter configured as shown in Figure 14. The 
attribute “EnglishOccupation” was defined to be a sensitive attribute when the 
transformation methods were selected. In this screen the attribute 
“EnglishOccupation” was selected with the property as “sensitive attribute”.  
 
 
Figure 14 : L-diversity Privacy Model Configuration 
 
5.3.5 Configure General Settings 
 
Within the general setting tab, various general configurations can be done. Refer to 
Figure 15 below. 
 
Firstly, the maximum number of outliers that may automatically be removed from the 
data set are specified. This is done by defining the suppression limit. The suppression 
limit is the maximum number of records that are removed. If the user selects 100% 
there will be no outliers in the data set. For this study, 100% was selected as the 
setting. 
 




Precomputation reduces the execution times for certain utility measures. In this study 
the recommended setting is "off". 
 
 
Figure 15: General Setting Configuration 
 
5.3.6 Specify Utility Measures 
 
In this tab, the utility measures that will be used in the study are configured. Refer to 
Figure 16 below. 
 
Firstly, the measure for utility is selected. This is done by specifying the data quality 
model. This can be used as an optimisation function during the anonymisation 
process. The measure selected was “Loss”. 
  
 
Figure 16: Utility Measure Configuration 
 
Secondly, monotonicity can be used to make the anonymisation process more 
efficient. This, however, can lead to significant reductions in output data quality. Thus, 




Finally, user-defined aggregate functions are configured. These aggregate functions 
are used to estimate the individual attributes within a data set into a global value. For 
this study, the recommended setting is "Arithmetic Mean". 
 
5.3.7 Specify Coding Model  
 
There are quality models which inform whether generalisation or suppression should 
take preference when transforming data. With this option, more generalisation or more 
suppression can be selected. The default option selected for both generalisation and 
suppression was equally suited at 50%. Figure 17 below refers. 
  
 
Figure 17: Coding Model Configuration 
 
5.3.8 Specify Attribute Weights 
Most privacy models support weighting an attribute to specify their level of importance 
in relation to other attributes. Therefore, when anonymising a data set, this 
functionality can be used to lessen the loss of information by assigning higher weights 
to certain attributes. 
  
Weights are then assigned to various attributes to influence the level of information 
loss i.e. Gender can have more influence than Marital Status within a data set when 
taking into consideration the full set of attributes. However, in this study the default 









In this chapter the series of steps to configure the environment in a suitable way to 
ensure the testing of the hypothesis was done. The setup of the privacy models, 
attributes, and data transformations were done, with general settings also configured. 
The graphical user interface was useful in doing the above. In the next chapter the 





In the previous chapter, the anonymisation process was setup and the testing 
performed. The tests were run in a configured environment for the data anonymisation 
using the two privacy models selected. In this chapter, the testing phase of the 
implementation is examined. The results of the data anonymisation process using the 
two chosen privacy models is reported. The visualisation of the solution space is 
presented in a useful way showing the transformations results. The outcomes for the 
data utility, the data quality, and privacy risk measures are documented.  
 
6.1 Exploring the Solution Space 
 
Once the anonymisation process has been completed the solution space can be 
viewed to organise transformations that have been automatically proposed. Figure 19 




Figure 19: Exploration Considerations 
 
6.1.1 Solution Space Testing 
 
The first step after the anonymisation is applied is to view the outcome of the 
anonymisation. Visually the results of the transformations that have been applied to 
the data set can be seen in multiple views. This view is called the solution space. 
Therefore, the solution space is a graphical representation of the transformations that 
have occurred as a result of anonymisation. The solution space will show 
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transformations that fulfil the defined privacy criteria according to the model selected. 
Transformations are automatically selected based on improved data utility and 
transformations that support optimal data utility. 
 
6.1.2 K-Anonymity: Solution Space Results 
 
In this section the solution space results for the k-anonymity privacy model are shown. 
A Hasse diagram, by definition, is a “mathematical diagram that represents a finite 
partially ordered set, in the form of a drawing of its transitive reduction.”  Figure 20 
below shows a Hasse diagram of the underlying generalisation lattice. In this diagram, 
every node represents a single transformation. These are identified by the 
generalisation levels that are specified for the quasi-identifiers that occur in the data 
set. 
 
Transformations are reflected using three background colours: 
• Green: a transformation which results in a privacy-preserving data set. 
• Red: a transformation which does not result in a privacy-preserving data set. 








Furthermore, the very same transformations as shown in a Hasse diagram in Figure 
20 can be shown as a list view in Figure 21 or as a tile view in Figure 22 below. 
 
 
Figure 21: K-anonymity Solution Space List View 
 
 
Figure 22: K-anonymity Solution Space Tile View 
 
As each node, row, or set of tiles in the two figures above represents one 
transformation that is applied to the input data set, it can be clearly seen that 36,864 
transformations have been applied to the data set using the k-anonymity privacy 
model. 
 
6.1.3 L-Diversity: Solution Space Results 
The solution space results for the l-diversity privacy model are shown in this section. 
Similar to the Hasse diagram view of the previous k-anonymity privacy model, Figure 
23, Figure 24, and Figure 25 below shows the solution space results for the l-diversity 





Figure 23: L-diversity Solution Space Lattice View 
 
 




Figure 25: L-diversity Solution Space Tile View 
It can be noted that the total number of transformations applied to the data set is 




A further discussion on the analysis of the solution space results is done in the next 
chapter. 
6.2 Analysing Data Utility  
 
The quality and the utility of the output data after the anonymisation has been 
completed is reported in this section. Utility, in terms of individual attributes as well as 
the entire data set, is analysed and shown graphically next to each other to allow for 
easy comparison.  Refer to Figure 26 below. 
 
6.2.1 Data Utility Testing 
 
Figure 26: Utility Analysis Considerations 
 
When testing the utility of the resultant data set, the following features are analysed:  
1. Data utility is analysed; 
2. Input and output data are compared, i.e. the transformed data set is compared 
to the input data set; 
3. Summary statistics of any selected attribute are shown; 
4. Frequency distribution for values of individual attributes are shown; 
5. A contingency heat map showing the contingency between two selected 
attributes; 







7. Properties of input and output data provides a basic display of the properties 
relating to the input data set; 
8. Classification performance; 
9. Data quality models are analysed. 
 
For the context of this study, a key feature from the list above that will be discussed in 
more detail below is an analysis of the data quality models. The data quality models 
are implemented to measure the utility of the output data set. 
 
6.2.1.1 Data Quality Models 
Data quality models are used to display the measurements of the data quality outputs 
when using various general-purpose models. The results within the software show two 
different types of data quality, namely: 
• Attribute-level quality shows measures relating to each quasi-identifier 
• Data-level quality shows quality measures for the entire set of quasi-identifiers,  
 
The following attribute-level quality models are implemented within ARX in this study 
[59]: 
• Granularity  
• Precision 
• Squared Error 
• Non-Uniform Entropy 
 
Additionally, the following data set level quality models were applied in this study: 
o Discernibility  
o Ambiguity 
o Average class size  
o Record-level squared error 
 
The data quality model results for each privacy model implemented are shown in detail 




6.2.2 K-anonymity Data Utility Results 
 
In this section, the data quality obtained for output data for the k-anonymity privacy 
model is shown. Attribute-level as well as data set level quality results are displayed. 
 
6.2.2.1 Data Quality Models  
In Figure 27 below, the results of the testing for data quality when using the k-
anonymity privacy model are shown. 
 
 
Figure 27: Data Quality Model Output Data – K-anonymity 
 







The following attribute level data quality measures were implemented, namely:  
1. Gen Intensity 
2. Granularity 
3. N-U. entropy 
4. Squared Error 
 









BirthDate 41.146 79.459 32.742 81.658 
MaritalStatus 0 0 0 0 
Gender 0 0 0 0 
YearlyIncome 49.724 38.986 10.255 64.822 
TotalChildren 41.146 49.375 29.610 67.269 
NumberChildren 28.448 34.137 17.615 54.218 
EnglishEducation 0 0 0 0 
HouseOwnerFlag 82.292 82.292 81.085 82.292 
NumberCarsOwned 27.679 29.133 9.286 30.786 
DateFirstPurchased 41.146 79.720 42.394 81.856 
 
Furthermore, data set level quality models were also tested. In Table 13 below, the 
data quality results for the seven data set level quality models are shown. These 
quality models are: 
• Gen intensity 
• Granularity 
• N U entropy 
• Discernibility 
• Average class size 
• Record-level squared error 






Table 13: Data set Level Data Quality Results 
Model Quality 
Gen intensity 35.158 
Granularity 41.969 
N U entropy 28.296 
Discernibility 82.267 
Average class size 99.973 
Record-level squared error 32.425 
Attribute-level squared error 81.758 
 
6.2.3 L-diversity Data Utility Results 
In this section the data quality obtained for the output data for the l-diversity privacy 
model are shown. As shown for k-anonymity previously, the attribute-level as well as 
the data set-level quality results are again displayed for the l-diversity output data. 
 
Data Quality Models 
In Figure 28 below, the results of the testing for data quality when using the l-diversity 
privacy model is shown. 
 
Figure 28: Data Quality Model Output Data –L-diversity 
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The data quality results for the four attribute-level quality models are shown in Table 
14 below. All four attribute level quality models are shown below. 
 









BirthDate 39.098 75.498 31.082 77.291 
MaritalStatus 0 0 0 0 
Gender 0 0 0 0 
YearlyIncome 47.048 36.708 8.898 62.161 
TotalChildren 39.098 46.918 27.971 63.740 
NumberChildren 27.722 32.066 15.577 51.450 
EnglishEducation 0 0 0 0 
HouseOwnerFlag 78.197 78.197 76.779 78.197 
NumberCarsOwned 26.188 19.825 8.010 29.289 
DateFirstPurchased 39.098 75.751 40.280 77.635 
 
Furthermore, the data quality results for the seven data set level quality models are 
shown in Table 15 below. 
 
Table 15: Data set Level Data Quality Results (L-diversity) 
Model Quality (%) 
Gen intensity 29.545 
Granularity 39.771 
N U entropy 26.674 
Discernibility 78.172 
Average class size 99.969 
Record-level squared error 30.802 
Attribute-level squared error 77.465 
 
A further discussion on the analysis of the data quality models that were tested is 




6.3 Analysing Privacy Risks  
 
In this section, the privacy risks post-anonymisation of the data set are analysed. The 
re-identification risks are measured with the results shown below. 
 
 
Figure 29: Privacy Risks Considerations 
 
6.3.1 Privacy Risks Testing 
 
When analysing privacy risks, the following features can be analysed:  
1. Within the records in the data set, the distribution of re-identification risks can 
be analysed; 
2. A combination of quasi-identifiers can be analysed with regards to re-
identification risks; 
3. Overview of re-identification risks measures.  
 
The key risk analysis measure that pertains to this study is the third option listed above, 
namely re-identification risks measures. This functionality relates directly to the testing 
of the hypothesis and will be used in this study.   
 
6.3.1.1 Re-identification Risks 
When considering the re-identification risks of the output data set, several measures 
for re-identification risks are proposed. When estimating privacy risks for an output 
data set, attacker models can be used. When measuring privacy risk, three different 




Prosecutor Attacker Model: it is assumed that the attacker has known knowledge 
that an individual is already contained in the data set; 
Journalist Attacker Model: it is assumed that an attacker has no information about 
an individual in the data set or their background data; 
Marketer Attacker Model: the assumption for this attacker model is that the attacker 
attacks a large number of individuals contained in a data set and is not particularly 
interested in de-identifying a single individual record. 
 
Below are the key measures that were used when determining the privacy risks 
associated for the data set in this study. These key measures for re-identification risks 
are detailed below: 
 
Lowest Prosecutor Risk: this measure shows (as a percentage) the lowest risk of 
re-identification when considering the prosecutor attacker model. 
Records affected by lowest risk: this measure shows the percentage of records 
(from the total record set) that are affected by the lowest risk when using the 
prosecutor attacker model. 
Average prosecutor risk: this measure shows (as a percentage) the average risk of 
re-identification when considering the prosecutor attacker model. 
Highest prosecutor risk: this measure shows (as a percentage) the highest risk of 
re-identification when using the prosecutor attacker model. 
Records affected by highest risk: this measure shows the percentage of records 
(from the total record set) that are affected by the highest risk when using the 
prosecutor attacker model 
Estimated prosecutor risk: this measure shows (as a percentage) the estimated risk 
of re-identification when considering the prosecutor attacker model. 
Estimated journalist risk: this measure shows (as a percentage) the estimated risk 
of re-identification when considering the journalist attacker model. 
Estimated marketer risk: this measure shows (as a percentage) the estimated risk 





6.3.2 K-anonymity Privacy Risks Results 
 
In this section the privacy risk results for the k-anonymity privacy model are shown.  
 
6.3.2.1 Re-identification Risks (K-anonymity) 
In Figure 30 below, the results of the testing for privacy of the input data set before 
anonymisation is performed are shown. Each of the re-identification risks are 
measured as a percentage before the anonymisation is performed. 
 
 





In Figure 31 below, the results of the testing for privacy risks when using the k-
anonymity privacy model are shown.  Each of the re-identification risks are measured 




Figure 31: Re-identification Risks of Output Data set (K-anonymity) 
 
A summary of the re-identification risks, both before and after anonymisation, is shown 
side-by-side in Table 16  below. Further analysis into these results, and the resultant 







Table 16: K-anonymity Privacy Risks Results (Before and After Anonymisation) 




Lowest Prosecutor Risk 100 5.55 
Records affected by lowest risk 100 0.23 
Average prosecutor risk 100 20.63 
Highest prosecutor risk 100 50 
Records affected by highest risk 100 10.78 
Estimated prosecutor risk 100 50 
Estimated journalist risk 100 50 
Estimated marketer risk 100 20.63 
Prosecutor Risk success rate 100 20.63 
Journalist Risk success rate 100 20.63 
Marketer Risk success rate 100 20.63 
 
6.3.3 L-diversity Privacy Risks Results 
In this section the privacy risk results for the l-diversity privacy model are shown.  
 
6.3.3.1 Re-identification Risks (L-diversity) 
In Figure 32 below, the results of the testing for privacy of the input data set before 
anonymisation is performed are shown. Each of the re-identification risks are 






Figure 32: Re-identification Risks of Input Data set (L-diversity) 
 
The resultant Figure 33 below shows the results of the testing for privacy risks after 
implementing the l-diversity privacy model. Each of the re-identification risks are 







Figure 33: Re-identification Risks of Output Data set (L-diversity) 
 
In Table 17 below a summary of the re-identification risk and individual risk measures, 
both before and after anonymisation using the l-diversity privacy model, are shown 
side-by-side.  
 
Table 17: L-diversity Privacy Risks Results (Before and After Anonymisation) 




Lowest Prosecutor Risk 100 5.55 
Records affected by lowest risk 100 0.24 
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Average prosecutor risk 100 19.30 
Highest prosecutor risk 100 50 
Records affected by highest prosecutor 
risk 
100 7.22 
Estimated prosecutor risk 100 50 
Estimated journalist risk 100 50 
Estimated marketer risk 100 19.30 
Prosecutor Risk success rate 100 19.30 
Journalist Risk success rate 100 19.30 
Marketer Risk success rate 100 19.30 
 
A discussion on the significance of the privacy risk measures post-anonymisation is 
done in the next chapter. 
6.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, the results from the design of the proof of concept and implementation 
thereof are documented. The various data utility measures, for both attribute level and 
data set level measures, were reported. Furthermore, a side-by-side comparison of 
three privacy risk attacker models, namely prosecutor risk attacker model, marketer 
risk attacker model, and journalist risk attacker model were also presented. In the next 









7 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
In the previous chapter, the results as observed from the testing were noted and 
documented.  The aim of this chapter is to show the clear results from the application 
of the various privacy models, data utility models, and risk attacker models to the data 
set. This chapter will also show what the results imply and whether the hypothesis and 
research succeeded or not. 
 
7.1 Interpretation of Findings 
 
In this section, the results for the overall transformations, data utility, and privacy risk 
results are analysed. 
 
7.1.1 Solution Space Results Analysis 
 
In the solution space, the transformations that were applied to the data set were 
analysed. These transformations were then captured in Table 18  below. 
 
Table 18: Combined Solution Space Transformations 




Table 18 above combines the results from both the k-anonymity and l-diversity privacy 
models when referring to the number of transformations as a result of the 
anonymisation.  It can be clearly seen that for both the k-anonymity and l-diversity 







7.1.2 Data Utility Results Analysis 
 
In the previous chapter the results for the data quality were recorded. This section will 
discuss the results of those data quality outputs in detail and in relation to the aims of 
this research.  
 
7.1.2.1 Attribute Level Data Quality 
 
The following four attribute level data quality measures were implemented.  
1. Gen Intensity 
2. Granularity 
3. N-U. entropy 
4. Squared Error 
 
Data quality was measured using the quasi-identifiers as configured previously. 
 
Table 19 represents (in tabular form) the comparison of the gen intensity attribute level 
quality models for k-anonymity and l-diversity. A side-by-side comparison of both 
privacy models is shown for all the quasi-identifiers in the data set. 
 
Table 19: Attribute Level Data Quality – Gen Intensity 
Attribute  K-Anonymity 
Gen Intensity (%) 
L-Diversity 
Gen Intensity (%) 
BirthDate 41.146 39.098 
MaritalStatus 0 0 
Gender 0 0 
YearlyIncome 49.724 47.048 
TotalChildren 41.146 39.098 
NumberChildren 28.448 27.722 
EnglishEducation 0 0 
HouseOwnerFlag 82.292 78.197 
NumberCarsOwned 27.679 26.188 




The ten quasi-identifier attributes were analysed against each attribute level data 
quality model. As shown by the results above, for every attribute in the data set the k-
anonymity privacy model performed better than the l-diversity model. Therefore, k-
anonymity retained a higher level of data quality when the gen intensity data quality 
model is applied.  
 
Table 20: Attribute Level Data Quality – Granularity 





BirthDate 79.459 75.498 
MaritalStatus 0 0 
Gender 0 0 
YearlyIncome 38.986 36.708 
TotalChildren 49.375 46.918 
NumberChildren 34.137 32.066 
EnglishEducation 0 0 
HouseOwnerFlag 82.292 78.197 
NumberCarsOwned 29.133 19.825 
DateFirstPurchased 79.720 75.751 
 
Table 20 represents (in tabular form) the comparison of the granularity attribute level 
quality models for k-anonymity and l-diversity. A similar side-by-side comparison is 
shown. 
As shown by the results above, for every attribute in the data set, the k-anonymity 
privacy model performed better than the l-diversity model. Therefore, it can be seen 
that k-anonymity retained a higher level of data quality when the granularity data 







Table 21: Attribute Level Data Quality – N-U. Entropy 
Attribute  K-Anonymity 
N-U. entropy (%) 
L-Diversity 
N-U. entropy (%) 
BirthDate 32.742 31.082 
MaritalStatus 0 0 
Gender 0 0 
YearlyIncome 10.255 8.898 
TotalChildren 29.610 27.971 
NumberChildren 17.615 15.577 
EnglishEducation 0 0 
HouseOwnerFlag 81.085 76.779 
NumberCarsOwned 9.286 8.010 
DateFirstPurchased 42.394 40.280 
 
Table 21 represents (in tabular form) the comparison of the n-u. entropy attribute-level 
quality model for k-anonymity and l-diversity. The side-by-side comparison is shown 
in the figure above. 
As shown by the results above, for every attribute in the data set the k-anonymity 
privacy model performed better than the l-diversity model. Therefore, k-anonymity 
retained a higher level of data quality when the n-u. entropy data quality model is 
applied. 
 
Table 22: Attribute Level Data Quality – Squared Error 
Attribute  K-Anonymity 
Squared error (%) 
L-Diversity  
Squared error (%) 
BirthDate 81.658 77.291 
MaritalStatus 0 0 
Gender 0 0 
YearlyIncome 64.822 62.161 
TotalChildren 67.269 63.740 
NumberChildren 54.218 51.450 
EnglishEducation 0 0 
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HouseOwnerFlag 82.292 78.197 
NumberCarsOwned 30.786 29.289 
DateFirstPurchased 81.856 77.635 
 
Table 22 represents (in tabular form) the comparison of the squared error attribute-
level quality model for k-anonymity and l-diversity. A side-by-side comparison is shown 
in the figure above with the k-anonymity performing better than l-diversity for the 
squared error data quality model.  
 
In summary, as shown by the results, for every attribute in the data set for the gen 
intensity, granularity, N-U entropy and squared error data quality models, the k-
anonymity privacy model performed better than the l-diversity model of all four 
measures. Therefore, it can be seen that k-anonymity retained a greater level of data 
quality for all attribute level data quality measures after the anonymisation process. 
 
 
7.1.2.2 Data set Level Data Quality 
 
For the data set level data quality models, quality was measured for the entire set of 
quasi-identifiers and not individual quasi-identifiers as was done with attribute level 
data quality models. 
 
Table 23: Combined Data set Level Quality Results 
Quality Model K-Anonymity (%) L-Diversity (%) 
Gen intensity 35.158 29.545 
Granularity 41.969 39.771 
N U entropy 28.296 26.674 
Discernibility 82.267 78.172 
Average class size 99.973 99.969 
Record-level squared error 32.425 30.802 




Table 23 above represents (in tabular form) the comparison of the k-anonymity and l-
diversity results. This is when the full data set of quasi-identifiers is referenced.  The 
results are shown for the following seven data set level quality models: 
1. Gen intensity 
2. Granularity 
3. N U entropy 
4. Discernibility 
5. Average class size 
6. Record-level squared error 
7. Attribute-level squared error 
 
A side-by-side comparison is shown in the figure above. As shown by the results, for 
all seven data set level quality models the k-anonymity privacy model performs better 
than the l-diversity model obtaining a higher percentage of quality. It is worthwhile to 
note that the k-anonymity privacy model retained a higher level of data quality than l-
diversity for all data set level quality measures. 
 
7.1.3 Privacy Risks Results Analysis 
 
In the previous chapter, the privacy risks for each privacy model were discussed and 
recorded. Furthermore, this section discusses the results of those outputs in more 
detail relating back to the aim of this study.  
 
7.1.3.1 Privacy Attacker Models  
 
The following three privacy risk attacker models were analysed, namely: 
1. Prosecutor Attack Model 
2. Journalist Attack Model 
3. Marketer Attack Model 
 
7.1.3.2 Privacy Risk Measures 
The following privacy risk measures were analysed for both k-anonymity and l-diversity 




Lowest Prosecutor Risk: this measure shows (as a percentage) the lowest risk of 
re-identification when considering the prosecutor attacker model. 
Records affected by lowest risk: this measure shows the percentage of records 
(from the total record set) that are affected by the lowest risk when using the 
prosecutor attacker model. 
Average prosecutor risk: this measure shows (as a percentage) the average risk of 
re-identification when considering the prosecutor attacker model. 
Highest prosecutor risk: this measure shows (as a percentage) the highest risk of 
re-identification when considering the prosecutor attacker model. 
Records affected by highest risk: this measure shows the percentage of records 
(from the total record set) that are affected by the highest risk when using the 
prosecutor attacker model. 
Estimated prosecutor risk: this measure shows (as a percentage) the estimated risk 
of re-identification when considering the prosecutor attacker model. 
Estimated journalist risk: this measure shows (as a percentage) the estimated risk 
of re-identification when considering the journalist attacker model. 
Estimated marketer risk: this measure shows (as a percentage) the estimated risk 
of re-identification when considering the marketer attacker model. 
 
7.1.3.3 Privacy Risks Results  
 
Re-identification risk outputs for the prosecutor, marketer, and journalist attacker 
models and their various measures are shown below. These measures are listed for 
the l-diversity and k-anonymity privacy model next to each other for comparison. 










Table 24: Combined Re-identification Risks Results 
Measure K-Anonymity (%) L-Diversity (%) 
Lowest Prosecutor Risk 5.55 5.55 
Records affected by lowest risk 0.23 0.24 
Average prosecutor risk 20.63 19.30 
Highest prosecutor risk 50 50 
Records affected by highest risk 10.78 7.22 
Estimated prosecutor risk 50 50 
Estimated journalist risk 50 50 
Estimated marketer risk 20.63 19.30 
Prosecutor Risk success rate  20.63 19.30 
Journalist Risk success rate 20.63 19.30 
Marketer Risk success rate 20.63 19.30 
 
Table 24 shows the key measures that were used when determining the privacy risks 
associated for the data set in this study. It can be noted, if an outcome of the re-
identification is high, the privacy model being used does not protect individual 
identifying information adequately in the data set. 
 
Finally, the prosecutor risk success rate, journalist risk success rate, and marketer risk 
success rate (highlighted in bold above) are the most important measures to consider 
in this study. These measures show the overall success rate of each attacker model 
when using relevant privacy models, and, therefore, the analysis of these measures 
refer directly to the aims of the research and hypothesis. 
 
As shown by the results in Table 24, the k-anonymity privacy model has a marginally 
higher rate of success when referring to all three attacker models. It is 1.36% higher 






7.2 Evaluation of Results 
 
7.2.1 Data Utility Evaluation 
 
In summary of the above, when referring to the attribute level data quality evaluation 
for each of the four attribute level data quality models, the k-anonymity privacy model 
performed better than the l-diversity model in every instance. Therefore, k-anonymity 
retained a higher level of data quality than l-diversity when measuring data set level 
quality. 
 
When evaluating the outputs against the seven data set level quality models, for every 
model the k-anonymity privacy model performed better than the l-diversity privacy 
model. 
 
It is consistent in this evaluation that for both attribute level and data set level quality 
models, k-anonymity retained the higher level of quality than l-diversity. 
 
7.2.2 Privacy Risks Evaluation 
 
When measuring re-identification risks, it was clearly seen that the l-diversity privacy 
model performed marginally better than k-anonymity. L-diversity had a 1.36% lower 
chance of re-identification than k-anonymity. Therefore, when evaluating the customer 
data set for privacy risk measure, the l-diversity privacy model is the better model 
between the two. 
7.3 Summary 
 
In this chapter, the analysis of the results presented in the previous chapter is 
documented. Both data quality models and privacy risk models were evaluated, and 
the outcomes captured. From a data quality perspective, k-anonymity results achieve 
a higher data quality output than l-diversity. However, when considering privacy risks, 
the l-diversity privacy model resulted in a lower re-identification risk across all three 
attacker models. In the next chapter, the results of the analysis are summarised to 





8.1 Research Summary 
  
In the previous chapter the analysis of the results from the implementation of the two 
privacy models are shown. In this chapter a summary of the research findings is 
discussed. As discussed previously, the need to protect personally identifying 
information is a relatively new concept in South Africa. With the promulgation of the 
POPI Act, the need for protecting customer data, using a practical approach, is 
becoming more and more important and necessary. The challenge faced with the 
implementation of a tool for anonymising data is that tools are not readily available. To 
this end, this study shows the implementation of two well-known privacy models in a 
practical, usable way in which to determine which of the anonymisation privacy models 
is more suited to ensure privacy protection for individuals to ensure POPI compliance. 
This chapter will summarise the research outcomes in relation to the research aim, 
research questions as well as research objectives. Finally, the results achieved are 
presented together with recommendations for future work. 
 
8.2 Discussion  
 
At the beginning of the thesis, research questions were developed in order to meet the 
aim and objectives of the research.  Firstly, to re-iterate, the following hypothesis was 
formulated: 
 
Practically implementing the k-anonymity privacy model to anonymise static 
customer data offers an effective solution to ensure POPI compliance by 
retaining the highest level of privacy without compromising the utility of the data. 
 
Thereafter, research questions were developed to concisely address the hypothesis 
and objectives. Table 1 mapped the research questions in relation to the research 
objectives to clearly show what the study was aiming to achieve.   A discussion of the 






MAIN: Which privacy-preserving anonymisation technique is appropriate for 
anonymising static customer data for POPI act compliance? 
SUB 1: Which privacy-preserving data anonymisation technique is appropriate for 
practically anonymising static customer data for POPI Act compliance by ensuring the 
lowest level of privacy risk? 
SUB 2: Can privacy-preserving data anonymisation techniques be practically applied 
to anonymise static customer data for POPI compliance in a way that preserves the 
greatest data utility? 
SUB 3: What are the effects of the levels of privacy risk and data utility in ensuring 
POPI Act compliance of static customer data? 
 
 
MAIN: Which privacy-preserving anonymisation technique is appropriate for 
anonymising static customer data for POPI act compliance? 
• Research Objective 1: Identify and evaluate existing data anonymisation 
techniques 
• Research Objective 2: Identify a data anonymisation tool to practically perform 
the data   anonymisation process 
• Research Objective 3: Implement two privacy models within a data 
anonymisation tool 
 
In order to address the main research question and research objectives above, an 
appropriate anonymisation tool was selected so that the anonymisation techniques as 
provided in the literature review could be tested. The implementation of an 
anonymisation tool was done in the environment as outlined in Chapter 4. Static 
customer data was sourced and used to simulate real-world customer banking data. 
Two privacy models were selected and configured for evaluation, namely k-anonymity 
and l-diversity. 
The results showed both privacy models evaluated can be adequately applied to 
anonymise static customer data in such a way to ensure adherence to the rules of 




SUB 1: Which privacy-preserving data anonymisation technique is appropriate 
for practically anonymising static customer data for POPI Act compliance by 
ensuring the lowest level of privacy risk? 
• Research Objective 4: Compare and contrast the results of the privacy models 
with one another with regards to the lowest level of privacy risk to ensure POPI 
Act adherence 
 
When taking privacy risks and data utility into consideration, l-diversity performed 
better than k-anonymity for all re-identification risks that were tested. Considering that 
protecting the privacy of an individual’s information is significantly more important that 
data utility preservation, l-diversity outperformed k-anonymity by 1.36%. 
 
SUB 2: Can privacy-preserving data anonymisation techniques be practically 
applied to anonymise static customer data for POPI compliance in a way that 
preserves the greatest data utility? 
• Research Objective 5: Compare and contrast the results of the privacy models 
with one another with regards to the highest level of utility retained so that the 
information is still useful 
 
As anonymisation of personally identifiable information can result in data that is not 
useful; the line between the level of data utility and the risk of re-identification is very 
fine. Therefore, this research aimed to quantify these output measures to allow for a 
fair comparison of the anonymisation privacy models selected for POPI compliance. 
In order to do this, data quality models were applied to the data set to measure the 
level of data quality achieved for each of the two privacy models.  
For attribute-level data quality measures of precision, granularity, non-uniform entropy 
and squared error, k-anonymity results were higher than l-diversity. 
For data set level data quality models, namely average class size, discernibility, 
ambiguity and record-level squared error k-anonymity once again performed better 
than l-diversity. In summary, k-anonymity performed better than l-diversity on all data 
quality models and measures.  
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When referring to privacy risks, the results were closer than expected. The following 
three attacker models were analysed, namely prosecutor attack model, journalist 
attack model, and marketer attack model. As shown by the results, the k-anonymity 
privacy model had a marginally higher rate of success when looking at the results of 
all three attacker models success rates. K-anonymity results were 1.36% higher for 
re-identification risk than l-diversity results for all three attacker models. Therefore, l-
diversity offers a lower chance of re-identification than k-anonymity. 
 
SUB 3: What are the effects of the levels of privacy risk and data utility in 
ensuring POPI Act compliance of static customer data? 
• Research Objective 6: Establish the effects of privacy risks and data utility for 
static customer data in relating to POPI Act compliance 
 
Finally, in showing the results, it was split evenly between the k-anonymity and l-
diversity privacy model with regards to the two measures tested, namely data utility 
and privacy risks. To summarise, k-anonymity retained the most data utility whilst l-
diversity offered the lowest privacy risk. Therefore, seeing that data privacy 
preservation is the key measure over data utility when taking personally identifiable 
information into consideration, anonymisation techniques that are implemented by the 
l-diversity privacy model are more successful at protecting privacy. 
 
8.3 Results Achieved 
 
In summary, the results of this study and the objectives were accomplished. In 
reviewing the hypothesis of this study, the tool selected successfully anonymised the 
static customer data set that was provided as input. The software platform allowed for 
the configuration of the anonymisation for each of the two data privacy models, namely 
l-diversity and k-anonymity, taking into consideration the generalisation of the 
individual attributes where appropriate. 
The outcomes, once the data anonymisation process was concluded, presented the 




In the first set of results, the data utility in relation to data quality models applied were 
analysed. The clear outcome was that on both attribute level data quality and data set 
level data quality, k-anonymity was better at retaining data utility than l-diversity.  
When the privacy risk attacker models were applied to the data set for each of the 
three attacker models, l-diversity showed a lower risk of re-identification than k-
anonymity.  
 
When taking both utility and privacy into consideration, neither privacy model selected 
is the clear winner. The k-anonymity privacy model is a better choice for data utility, 
and l-diversity privacy model is a better choice for privacy preservation. However, 
when referring to the hypothesis that the k-anonymity privacy model is more suitable 
to anonymise data with regards to the POPI Act, an outcome is that the l-diversity 
model is the more successful model of the two. Therefore, the hypothesis that k-
anonymity is more suitable for data anonymisation for POPI compliance is not true 
when considering the measure of privacy risk. L-diversity is the preferred privacy 
model. 
 
Finally, considering that the POPI Act is still awaiting the final step to be promulgated 
into law, financial institutions and specifically banking institutions will have the 
necessary time to conduct further experiments to practically implement and apply data 
anonymisation techniques in their day-to-data processing of data and information. This 
is because there will be a period until the law is made effective. If the key aspect of 
ensuring that the right to privacy of an individual is always guaranteed, the analysis of 
customer banking data by external or third parties can be enforced.  
8.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
With the promulgation of the POPI Act still to come, and with data privacy implications 
for companies cutting across jurisdictions and countries, ensuring data privacy for 
individuals will become a common place in the future in South Africa. Banking 
institutions will need to be more agile to keep up with ensuring regulatory compliance 




When using the tool ARX for anonymisation of data, the alternative for a public 
Application Programming Interface (API) instead of using the graphical interface is 
provided. All features and functionality are available within the API. This would allow 
for the de-identification methods to be made available to other software systems for 
scenarios where this would be easier.  
Therefore, a key recommendation for future research would be to implement the 
anonymisation tool ARX in an API environment for integration with a Java platform 
using the POPI Act as the area of legislation. By doing so, this will allow for the use of 
ARX for non-static data in an environment. 
 
Seeing that ARX is open-source and not a commercial tool, the development of an 
option for evaluating other privacy risks in ARX, similar to the HIPAA tab, would be 
useful. The HIPAA tab refers to the regulations that govern the adherence to the 
HIPAA Act as outlined in Chapter 2. Eighteen key identifiers have been specified for 
modification or removal by the Safe Harbour method of HIPAA. A similar 
implementation for modifying or removing known identifiers in ARX could automatically 
allow for the detection of POPI identifiers and appropriately anonymise that data. This 
would be a very useful feature in future.   
 
Once the Information Regulator has proposed clear rules on how customer information 
can and cannot be processed with regards to the POPI Act, these rules can be written 
into ARX and applied to customer data in South Africa similar to how the HIPAA tab is 
structured. As a result, the privacy risk in relation to the POPI Act can then be viewed 
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10.1 K-anonymity Data Utility Results 
 
The data utility results for the k-anonymity privacy model is shown below. The attribute 
“YearlyIncome” was selected. 
 
10.1.1 Input Output Data - All Fields 
 
 
Figure 34: Input and Output Data 
The input data set is shown on the left pane and the results after anonymisation is 
shown on the right pane.   
 
10.1.2 Summary Statistics – Attribute Level 
 
 
Figure 35: Summary Statistics 
 




10.1.3 Frequency Distribution – Attribute level 
 
 
Figure 36: Frequency Distribution 
A table or histogram that visualises the frequency distribution of the values of the 
selected attribute is shown above.  
 
10.1.4 Contingency - Attribute Level across 2 Attributes 
 
Figure 37: Contingency 
The figure above represents a heat map that visually shows the contingency of two 
selected attributes. Contingency refers to the multivariate frequency distribution of the 
variables. 
 
10.1.5 Equivalence Classes and Records – All Records 
 
Figure 38: Equivalence Classes and Records 
 
The figure above shows the equivalence classes and records which summarises the 
information and shows the minimal class size, maximal class size and average size of 







10.1.6 Properties of Input and Output Data  
 
 
Figure 39: Properties of Input and Output Data 
 
Properties of input data tab within ARX shows the basic properties of the input data 
set and the configuration used for anonymisation. The properties of output data tab 
show the basic properties about the selected data transformation as well as the 
resultant output data set. Figure 39 refers. 
 
10.1.7 Classification Performance  
 
 




Configuration of the classification models and their parameters can be done in this 
view. Performance of the models can also be seen.  Please refer to the figure above. 
 
10.2 L-diversity Data Utility Results 
 
10.2.1 Input Output Data 
 
Figure 41: Input and Output Data 
 
The input data set on shown on the left pane and the results after anonymisation is 
shown on the right pane.   
 
10.2.2 Summary Statistics 
 
Figure 42: Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics for the chosen attribute is shown here.  
 
10.2.3 Frequency Distribution 
 
Figure 43: Frequency Distribution 
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A table or histogram that visualises the frequency distribution of the values of the 




Figure 44: Contingency 
The figure above represents a heat map that visually shows the contingency of two 
selected attributes. Contingency refers to the multivariate frequency distribution of the 
variables. 
 
10.2.5 Equivalence Classes and Records 
 
Figure 45: Equivalence Classes and Records 
The figure above shows the equivalence classes and records which summarises the 
information and shows the minimal class size, maximal class size and average size of 




10.2.6 Properties of Input and Output Data 
 
Figure 46: Properties of Input and Output Data 
Properties of input data shows the basic properties of the input data set and the 
configuration used for anonymisation. The properties of output data tab show the basic 
properties about the selected data transformation as well as the resultant output data 
set. 
 
10.2.7 Classification Performance 
 
Figure 47: Classification Performance 
Configuration of the classification models and their parameters can be done in this 




10.3 K-anonymity Privacy Risks Results 
 
10.3.1 Distribution of Risks 
The distribution of risks between the input and output data set is shown side-by-side. 
 
 






Figure 49: Distribution of Risks in tabular form 
 
 




Figure 51: Distribution of Risks in tabular form 
 
10.3.2 Quasi-Identifiers 
Within the quasi-identifiers tab, an analysis can be done with the combinations of 
attributes side-by-side. The associated re-identification risks can also be viewed. 
Please refer to Figure 52. 
 
 






10.4 L-diversity Privacy Risks Results 
 
10.4.1 Distribution of Risks 
The distribution of risks between the input and output data set is shown side-by-side. 
 
 
Figure 53: Distribution of Risks 
 
 
Figure 54: Distribution of Risks in tabular form 
 
10.4.2 Quasi-identifiers 
Within the quasi-identifiers tab, an analysis can be done with the combinations of 
attributes side-by-side. The associate re-identification risks can also be viewed. 
 
 
Figure 55: Quasi-identifiers 
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10.5 HIPAA Tab  
 
 
Figure 56: HIPAA Tab and Identifiers 
 
The HIPAA tab within ARX automatically detects the eight identifiers that must be 
modified or removed from a data set. 
